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I. INTRODUCTION
After years of delay, frustration, and acrimonious debate, in July of .1990
the European Council adopted two direct tax directives' and an arbitration
convention among the Community Member States.2 These measures
represent the first significant legislation adopted in the area of direct
taxation3 since the inception of the European Community (EC) in 1957.
Many European commentators have hailed the directives as no less than "speI. Council Directive 90/435 of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation
Applicable in the Case of Parent Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States,
1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 [hereinafter Parent-Subsidiary Directive]; Council Directive 90/434 of 23
July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation Applicable to Mergers, Division, Transfer of
Assets and Exchange of Shares Concerning Companies of Different Member States 1990 O.J.
(L 225) 1 [hereinafter Merger Directive].
2. Convention 90/463 on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associates Enterprises 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 [hereinafter Arbitration
Convention].
3. Direct taxation refers to taxes which are imposed directly on individuals or firms,
whereas indirect taxation is those that are included in the price of the goods or services and
therefore borne by the final consumer.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss1/6
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ctacular" events on the path towards eliminating major tax obstacles within
the Community. These measures, in particular the initiative known as the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive (Directive), will accelerate development of the
European Internal Market. A strong internal market should in turn improve
the profitability and competitiveness of Community multinationals. The
Directive therefore represents both a significant opportunity and a challenge
to U.S. business and domestic tax policy.
The idea behind these direct taxation initiatives is.
for a company of a
Member State to operate at the same cost in any other market within the
Community [as in its domestic market]. Essentially, the decision to expand
into other markets within the Community and take full advantage of the
Internal Market should not be based on, or limited by, tax considerations. 4
In this respect, the Directive is a significant step forward. The ParentSubsidiary Directive eliminates withholding taxes on inter-corporate
dividends from a subsidiary. The Directive also requires the Member State
where the parent corporation is located to refrain from taxing such profits
altogether or provide a credit for any corporate tax paid by the subsidiary.'
By these mechanisms, the Directive should help eliminate economic and
juridical double taxation of dividends.
The Directive accomplished these objectives through nine straightforward
and remarkably simplistic articles which were to be implemented by the
Member States by January 1, 1992. As a result of the brevity of the
Directive as an instructive document, a Member State has wide latitude in
adopting implementing legislation. Any differences and inconsistencies in
Member State legislation may have to be resolved through the European
Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
Because of these ambiguities, tax planners and investors must understand
the provisions of the Directive as well as the manner in which the Member
States have implemented them. For U.S. businesses, the Directive presents

4. Specifically, the Commission seeks to remove the most egregious tax barriers to the
completion of the internal market, abolish all forms of corporate double taxation, and thus
facilitate cross-border inter-company cooperation. Commission Communication to Parliament
and the Council, Guidelines on Company Taxation, SEC (90) 601 (1990) [hereinafter
Guidelines on Company Taxation].
5.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, arts. 4, 5. The purpose of the Merger
Directive is to defer tax on capital gains for share exchanges in cross-border, intra-Community
mergers and acquisitions. Merger Directive, supra note 1,pmbl. The Arbitration Convention
establishes an arbitration procedure to eliminate double taxation in the course of transfer
pricing disputes. Arbitration Convention, supra note 2, pmbl. For in-depth discussions of the
Merger Directive and Arbitration Convention, see Jonathan Fox, European Community Tax
Directives, 17 INT'L TAX J. 45 (1991); David C. Donald, Taxation for a Single Market:
European Community Legislation on Mergers, DistributedProfits, and Intra-Company Sales,
22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37 (1991); Jurgen Killius, The EC Arbitration Convention, 10
INTERTAX 437 (1990).
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a significant challenge because it may reduce costs for Community
multinationals and will encourage more intra-Community investment rather
than E.C. investment in the United States or elsewhere. While measures exist
for U.S. businesses to qualify under the Directive, these measures have U.S.
tax consequences. Essentially, the Directive forces U.S. companies with
European operations to reconsider their corporate structure in the EC.
This article will address these issues. The next chapter begins with a
brief overview of the institutional structure of the European Community, to
explain the EC taxation decision-making process. Next, a discussion of the
history of the direct tax directives follows, including the reasons for the prior
lack of success in direct tax reform compared to that achieved with indirect
taxation. The third chapter will then discuss the legal basis for the
Community's direct tax initiatives, the scope and intent of the individual
provisions of the Directive, and the effect of the Directive on double taxation
treaties among both Member States and third countries.
The fourth chapter discusses the effect of the Directive itself as well as
the implementation legislation adopted by the Member States. Finally, the
fifth chapter explores the planning opportunities for U.S. enterprises,
including several recommendations for changes in U.S. tax policy to enable
U.S. businesses to respond to the EC initiatives.
II.

BACKGROUND

The process of enacting direct tax legislation in the Community is like
theater. It involves many actors, two with leading roles, and numerous others
providing support. Appreciating the play requires understanding both the
actors and their script. This section begins with a brief overview of the
institutional structure of the EC as created by the basic treaties. After
introducing the four primary EC institutions, of which only two, the Council
of Ministers and the European Commission, play important roles, the next
section will discuss the forms in which legislation can occur. Finally, a
discussion of the EC's legislative process, with the primary reference to
direct taxation, follows.
A.

The InstitutionalStructure of the European Community

The European Community represents a sui generis form of international
organization and governance. This unique form is embodied in three basic
treaties. These treaties define the scope and powers of the central institutions
and the relationship between these institutions and the national governments

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss1/6
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of the Member States.'
1. The Basic Treaties
In April of 1951, six European states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) formed the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) by the Treaty of Paris.7 These six ECSC states
strengthened their association with the signing of the Treaty of Rome and
subsequent creation of the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) 8 and the European Economic Community (EEC) 9 on March
25, 1957. The central idea behind these treaties, particularly the Treaty of
Rome, was to create "a single integrated market free of restrictions on the
movement of goods .... persons, services, and capital."'
These three treaties are distinct legal entities." Each treaty has its own
legal personality under both international law and the national law of the
Member States.' 2 Consequently, each treaty provided for its own separate
governing bodies, including a Council, a Commission, 3 a Court, and an
Assembly. In order to simplify the institutional structure established vis-A-vis4
these treaties, the Member States entered into the so-called Merger Treaty
in April of 1965. This treaty consolidated the governing bodies of the three
treaties so that from July 1, 1967, one Council, one Commission, one

6.
STANLEY HENIG, POWER AND DECISION IN EUROPE: THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 13 (1980).

7. The purpose of this treaty, which entered into force July 25, 1952, was to place the
entire steel and coal production of the contracting parties under one "High Authority" and
thereby to "create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY] pmbl.
8. This treaty, which entered into force on January 1, 1958, was intended to create
conditions "necessary for a powerful nuclear industry which will provide extensive energy
resources.' TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY
[EURATOM TREATY] pmbl.
9. The EEC Treaty, by far the most ambitious and far-reaching, had as its overall
objective "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" and

also entered into force on January 1, 1958.

TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC

COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] pmbl.
10. Id.
11.
ECSC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 6; EURATOM TREATY, supra note 8, art. 184;
EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 210.
12.
Case 28/64, Mfiller v. Council, 1965 E.C.R. 237, 247; Case 43/64, Mtiller v.
Council, 1965 E.C.R. 385, 395.
13.
The ECSC treaty refers to a "High Authority" rather than a Commission. ECSC
TREATY, supra note 7, art. 7.
14. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities, 1967 O.J. (L 152) 1 [hereinafter Merger Treaty].
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Assembly,' 5 and one Court served all three of the Communities.16
Today the European Community consists of four institutions: the Council
of Ministers, 7 the Commission,"8 The European Parliament,' 9 and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).2"
The two primary Community
institutions are the Commission and the Council who act, in an admittedly
loose analogy, as the executive and legislative branches of the EC, respectively. Essentially, the legislative process in the Community involves a
protracted system of compromise and consultation which is initiated by the
15. The Assembly was later to become known as the European Parliament. Resolution
of March 30, 1962, 1962 J.0. 1045.
16. P.S.R.F. MATHIUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 8 (5th ed. 1990).
17.
The Council is comprised of one representative from each Member State. EEC
TREATY, supra note 9, art. 146, as amended by Merger Treaty, supra note 14, art. 2(l). These
representatives act on the basis of instructions from the governments of their respective
Member States; however, in theory, as the Council is a Community institution, they must act
in the Community interest. MATH1JSEN, supra note 16, at 35. There are "general" Council
meetings, which are comprised of the foreign affairs ministers of the Member States, and
special council meetings, which deal with specialized Community topics such as agriculture,
economy, finance, and social affairs. In special Council meetings the foreign affairs ministers
usually do not serve as representatives. Rather, the representatives are generally the national
ministers responsible for the particular sector at issue.. For example, the Economic and
Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of the particular Member States make decisions in direct taxation
matters.
18. The Commission consists of 17 members who are nominated by their national
governments, and appointed by common accord of all the Member States. EEC TREATY,
supra note 9, art. 157(1), as amended by Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession and the
Adjustment to the Treaties--Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Spain
and the Portuguese Republic, art. 15, 1985 O.J. (1302) [hereinafter Act of Accession];
MATHIJSEN, supra note 16, at 53. Their appointments are for four years. No more than two
of the commissioners may have the same nationality, and their independence (despite the fact
that they are nominated by the national governments) must be "beyond doubt." EEC TREATY,
supra note 9, art. 157(1)i The work of the Commission is conducted through 22 Directorate
Generals (DG) that have responsibility in specific competencies including Financial Institutions
and Company Law, which has responsibility for direct taxation.
19. The role of the European Parliament is primarily advisory and supervisory; the
Parliament has few powers. The European Parliament is comprised of "representatives of the
people of the States brought together in the Communities." EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art.
137. There are a total of 518 seats spread proportionally among the Members States. Id. art.
138(2). The distribution of seats is based on the following formula: France, Germany, Italy,
United Kingdom 81; Spain 60; The Netherlands 25; Belgium, Greece, Portugal 24; Denmark
16; Ireland 15; Luxembourg 6.
Id. A Member of the European Parliament is elected for a term of five years.
20. The role of the ECJ is to ensure the observance, interpretation, and application of
treaty law. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 164. The ECJ is the supreme authority on all
matters of Community law. The ECJ has its seat in Luxembourg and is comprised of 13
justices. Id. art. 165, as amended by Act of Accession, supra note 18, art. 17. The
independence of the justices must be beyond doubt, and they must posses qualifications
required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries. EEC
TREATY, supra note 9, art. 167. The justices of the ECJ are appointed by common accord
among the Member States for six-year terms. Id.
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Commission but ultimately approved by the Council of Ministers." Before
discussing the decision-making process involved in adopting tax legislation,
a brief discussion of Article 189, which provides the Council and the
Commission with the authority and the mechanism to enact legislation, is
necessary.
2.

The Legislative Mechanisms of Article 189

In addition to the primary law created by the basic treaties, the EC has
a vast body of secondary law. The legal basis of this secondary law is
Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. 22 Article 189 provides the Council and the
Commission with legislative powers in the form of regulations, 23 directives, 24 decisions, 25 and recommendations and opinions. 26 Regulations,
directives, and decisions are the most powerful and frequently used
legislative mechanisms. Directives are more appropriate when existing
national legislation requires modification or if Member States must enact
additional provisions. 27 As the Parent-Subsidiary tax legislation required
either the modification of existing national law or the enactment of specific
implementing provisions in every Member State, with the possible exception
of the United Kingdom, 28 the "directive" form proved the most appropriate.
Also, directives generally appear more politically palatable than
regulations, because they give Member States discretion to decide how to
implement the particular legislation while taking into account each Member
States respective economic and social policies. 29 As a result of this
direction, however, significant differences in the actual legislation
implemented by the Member States can arise. This is, exactly what has

21.
The Council of Ministers must be distinguished from the European Council, which
is not an official institution of the EC. The European Council is a meeting held at least twice
per year among the Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission. The
purpose of the European Council is to issue broad policy guidelines for both the Council and
the Commission. MATHUSEN, supra note 16, at 43.
22. In order to carry out their responsibilities, the Council and Commission shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue directives, make
decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 189.
23. Regulations are generally applicable and binding in their entirety on all the Member
States. As such, regulations do not require further implementation in order to take effect. Id.
24. Directives are binding as to the result to be achieved, but each Member State has
discretion to choose the form and method of implementation in order to take effect. Id.
25.
Decisions are individual acts designed to be addressed to a specified person or
persons. Decisions do not require Member State implementation in order to take effect. Id.
26. Recommendations and opinions have no binding effect, but are persuasive authority.
Id.
27. MATHIJSEN, supra note 16, at 114.
28. See infra notes 205-50 and accompanying text.
29. See General Note, European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty Article 100, BII
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW (MB) B 10-232 (1987).
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happened with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Some Member States have
interrupted the Directive and adopted implementing legislation that could
potentially undermine the full value of the Directive itself.3"
These
inconsistencies may ultimately result in ECJ proceedings brought by the
Commission against a Member State.
3.

The Legislative Process for Direct Taxation

In Article 100 the EEC Treaty provides, albeit in very general terms, the
only legislative process for adopting direct taxation legislation. Normally,
proposals are developed and adopted through the "consultation procedure" an excessively pragmatic approach to adopting Community legislation. As
the name implies, this process involves consultation with numerous interested
bodies; but ultimately, any directive on direct taxation requires unanimous
Council approval."
In practice, the consultation procedure has been
modified over the last several years, partly because of the need to attain
unanimity, and partly in response to industry demands.32 The following
description of this legislative process reviews the substantive requirements of
Article 100 and the procedural modifications as they have developed under
recent Community practice.
Legislative initiatives, in direct taxation or otherwise, normally originate
in the Commission. The Council does not, in practice, introduce tax
legislation itself. Within the Commission, DG 15 is the Directorate
responsible for direct taxation.33 DG 15 will draft direct taxation proposals
where it identifies particular aspects of the Member States' national taxation
systems that prevent or obstruct companies from operating freely in the

30. In addition, directives usually only become binding after a deadline is established
in the directive itself. When Member States fail to adopt implementing legislation within this
deadline, or adopt legislation inconsistent with the directive, beneficiaries may invoke the
directive against the national government in the national courts. Because several Member
States have either failed to adopt implementing legislation or have adopted legislation which
is inconsistent with the requirements of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the potential direct
effect of the Directive is of critical importance. For a full discussion of this point, see infra
notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
31. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 100. The Single European Act introduced a
fundamental amendment to Article 100 through Article 100a. The Single European Act, 3
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 20,000 (1989) [hereinafter SEA]. Article 100a permitted a
derogation from the normal unanimity requirement for Community decision-making and
permitted a qualified majority to reach decisions in order to achieve the objectives of an
internal market. Id. art. 18. Unfortunately, paragraph two of Article 100a specifically
excluded decision-making by qualified majority from any fiscal matter, including direct
taxation. Id.
32. Interview with David Carr, expert in Company Taxation and Other Direct Taxation
with the European Commission, in Brussels, Belgium (Mar. 29, 1993).
33. The Commission is divided into 22 Directorate Generals. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
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where possible,
internal market.34 DG 15 also works directly with industry,
3
in identifying problems and drafting these proposals. "
After formulating a proposal, a consultative committee, the Group de
Travail No.4 for direct taxation proposals, would normally receive the
document. This particular working group is comprised of the taxing
authorities of the Member States. Their job is to provide a working paper
providing their response to the proposal as well as any recommendations.36
If it appears that the document is in fact a "workable proposal," it next goes
to the Commissioner responsible for direct taxation matters.37 If the
Commissioner accepts the proposal, it is forwarded to the Commission's legal
department for review and translated into the Community's nine official
languages. 3' Next, the entire Commission will receive the proposal and will
vote on its adoption by simple majority.
Once adopted, the Commission will then formally submit the proposal to
the Council of Ministers. At this point the proposal becomes a "draft
directive" and the Council assumes control of the discussions. In the
meantime, the Commission will also submit the "draft directive" to both the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)3 9
to obtain their opinions.40 The European Parliament and ECOSOC will
review the draft and submit their recommendations to the Commission.
These recommendations are not binding and the Commission may ignore,
amend, or accept them and submit the recommendations to the Council. 4
The Council President is responsible for setting meetings on the draft
directive. The Council's drafting technicians hold the first series of meetings

34. Removal of Tax Obstacles to the Cross FrontierActivities of Companies, BULL. E.C.,
8 Supp. 4/91 [hereinafter Removal of Tax Obstacles].
35. Interview with David Carr, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Currently, Madame Scrivener is the Commissioner responsible for company taxation
and other direct taxation.
38. These languages are French, English, Danish, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese
and Spanish.
39. This committee is comprised of 189 members appointed by the Council to serve
four-year terms. The members are representatives of various business and social activities
including producers, farmers, carriers, workers, tradesmen, members of the professions, and
the general public. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, arts. 193-98. ECOSOC serves as an advisory
body to the Council and Commission. Id. art. 4(2).
40. In contrast, proposals on indirect taxation only require consultation with the
European Parliament. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 99, as amended by the SEA, supra
note 31, art. 17. For directives, which require the amendment of the national legislation,
article 189 of the EEC requires the consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and
the European Parliament.
41.
The Single European Act introduced a modified procedure, the cooperation
procedure, which is intended in part to give the European Parliament a greater role. This
procedure, however, does not apply in fiscal areas such as taxation. SEA, supra note 31.
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and review, in excruciating detail, the language of the Directive.42 From
here the draft goes to the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER). 43
This body is responsible for resolving any political
problems with the Directive. 4 After COREPER acts and the technicians
review the Commission's amendments, they submit the draft directive to the
Council's Economic and Finance Ministers ("ECOFIN"), 45 who vote on the
draft. ECOFIN need not accept the draft directive and may reject it entirely
or amend it (by unanimity) before adopting it.46 The Council must
unanimously approve the draft directive.47
The adoption of directives is an evolving process and highly sensitive to
the political exigencies of the Community. Nevertheless, the Council adopted
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in essentially this manner.
B.

HistoricalOverview to the Adoption of the Directive

Over 21 years elapsed between the time the Commission introduced the
Parent-Subsidiary and Merger Directives in January of 1969 and the
Council's final adoption in July of 1990. The lag resulted in part because of
the greater importance placed upon removing the physical barriers caused by
indirect taxation as well as the Commission's overly ambitious original effort
at corporate tax harmonization.4" Only after the indirect tax obstacles were
removed and the Commission formally abandoned its tax harmonization
efforts did the EC make headway with direct taxation. The following
discussion reviews the history of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive culminating
in its adoption in 1990. Because of the ambiguities within the Directive, as
well as the inconsistent implementing legislation of the Member States, the
history of Community policy towards direct taxation will provide an
important tool for the ECJ to resolve future disputes.

42. Interview with David Carr, supra note 32.
43. The COREPER was established to provide a permanent presence of the Council.
Its responsibility is to prepare the work of the Council, make preparations for Council
meetings, and execute any task the Council assigns it. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 151,
repealed by Merger Treaty, supra note 14, art. 4.; BUTTERWORTH'S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES §§ 6.4, 25 (1989).
44. Interview with David Carr, supra note 32.
45. ECOFIN is the group of ministers of the Member States who are responsible for
voting in Council meetings on fiscal issues including taxation. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
46. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 149, as amended by Act of Accession, supra note
18, art. 14.
47. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 100.
48. Even the Community's official publication acknowledges this point. See Opening
up the Internal Market (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1991).
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1. Early Progress in Direct Taxation: 1962-1969
A great deal of the success achieved by the EC in the fields of direct and
indirect taxation resulted from the work of various committees of experts.49
The Neumark Committee Report of 1962 recommended a common system
of value-added tax to replace existing turnover taxes and a first phase of tax
harmonization to deal with the taxation of dividends and interest and the
problem of double taxation. 0 Four years later, the Segr6 Committee
prepared a report on the establishment of an integrated capital market within
the Community."
A number of the recommendations of these two committees were in its
program for direct taxation, published in 1967.2 This 1967 Proposal was
the Commission's first elucidation of its program for direct taxation. The
Commission stated that Community-level action was necessary to ensure that
tax obstacles would not prevent the corporate structural changes essential to
the development of the Common Market. 3 In short, the Commission
thought that to compete with its U.S. and Japanese counterparts, cross-border
transactions involving amalgamation of Community companies were
necessary. 4 And, no less importantly, the Commission also thought that
facilitating cross-border transactions between Member State companies would
further integrate the Member States."5
With this in mind, the Commission viewed withholding taxes as a
specific obstacle to the full achievement of the Common Market. Despite the
existing network of double taxation treaties among the Member States, the
Commission found that withholding taxes frequently caused double taxation
or over-taxation, causing complications for investors and providing the "basic

49. See Alex Easson, Harmonization of Direct Taxation in the European Community:
From Neumark to Ruding, 40 CAN. TAX J. 600 (1992).
50. Report of Fiscaland FinancialCommittee, 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 3211.03
(1975) [hereinafter Neumark Report].
51.
Commission of the European Communities, Le Ddveloppement d'un March
Europden des Capitux, Report of the Group of Experts Established by the Commission
(Brussels: the Commission, 1966).
52. Commission's 1967 Programfor Company Tax Harmonization, 2 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 3211.05 (1975) [hereinafter 1967 Proposal].
53. Id. at 4, 7.
54. Id. at 7. In fact, one of the consistently reoccurring themes in all of the
Community's direct taxation initiatives has been to actively promote, through the abolition of
national tax obstacles and the improvement of Community level cooperation, the development
of "European companies." As the Commission stated in 1988, "only through Community-level
industrial cooperation will it be possible to bring together the large amounts of capital and
technical know-how required to ensure competition in world markets." Memorandum from the
Commission to Parliament, the Council, and Two Sides of Industry, COM(88)320 final, at 5.
55. Easson, supra note 49, at 610.
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reason for abnormal movements of capital. 56 Nevertheless, at this point the
Commission did not go so far as to advocate the abolition of withholding
taxes,7 instead urging greater harmonization of the system of applying this
tax.

5

However, the Commission then made a fatal mistake. While it was
reluctant to address the problem of withholding taxes, the Commission did
not hesitate to directly attack the issue of corporate tax harmonization, a
considerably larger, more complex problem upon which Member States have
never agreed. Based on the wide differences in tax systems within the
Community, the Commission decided that to promote fair competition and
free investment,"8 the Member States must harmonize their corporate tax
systems.59 Unfortunately, the Commission overestimated the Member
States' will to relinquish fiscal sovereignty, derailing direct taxation efforts
for the next fifteen years.
Two years later, the Commission changed its mind with respect to the
abolition of withholding taxes. In 1969, the Commission published proposals
on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Merger Directive as well.6"
Nevertheless, the Parent-Subsidiary and Merger Directives were viewed
merely as part of the much larger program of direct tax harmonization, then
thought achievable within a period of five years. 6' This did not happen.
2.

A Period of Minimal Progress: 1970-1984

The ambitious effort at corporate tax harmonization soon faced serious
obstacles. In 1970, Member States used three corporate tax systems: the
classical system, 62 the imputation system 63 and the split-rate system.' 4

56. 1967 Proposal, supra note 52, at 10-11., This was later supported by the findings
of the Ruding Committee, an independent body of tax experts the Commission appointed in
1990 that reported in June 1992. The Ruding Committee concluded that the different tax
regimes distorted the functioning of the internal market for both goods and capital and that
action at the Community level was necessary. Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation 28 (Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1992) [hereinafter Ruding Report].
57.
1967 Proposal, supra note 52, at 12.
58. Id. at 7.

59.

Id. at 8.

60. Proposal for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 1969 O.J. (C 39) 7 [hereinafter 1969
Draft Directive]; Proposal for the Merger Directive, 1969 O.J. (C 39) 1.
61.
1967 Proposal, supra note 52, at 10, 11.
62. Under this system, some form of an imputation or credit is provided at the
shareholder level for part or all of the taxes the corporation paid on the profits distributed.
Currently, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom utilize this system.
63. Under this system, there is no offset at the shareholder level for taxes previously
paid at the corporate level on profits distributed. As such, double taxation occurs. The
classical system is used by Spain, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
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In order to harmonize corporate taxation, Member States would have to make
a fundamental decision as to which system to adopt. While the Nuemark
Report had favored the split-rate method, 6 a subsequent report, the Van den
Tempel Report, had favored the classical system because of its inherent
simplicity.66 Because any decision required a unanimous vote by the
Council, agreement on a single proposal seemed unlikely.
An even greater obstacle was the belief of various Member States that
harmonization was, at best, unnecessary, while at worst, an infringement on
their national sovereignty. Several national governments simply thought that
harmonization was unnecessary because harmonization would result as the
natural by-product of competition between national taxation systems and the
pressures of market forces. 67 They pointed to the United States as an
example of a federal system in which, over time, the differences among the
tax systems of the states were reduced.68
Other Member States charged that efforts at harmonization went too far,
violating national sovereignty. 69 Member States used their taxing power in
entirely different ways, often to shape their particular social, political, and
economic policies.70 They viewed the coordination of tax systems to mean
both a loss of tax revenues71 and a sacrifice of specific domestic programs
and policies. Further, because many Member States already perceived a loss
of sovereignty in other areas, especially indirect taxation, they simply did not
want to relinquish any more sovereignty.72
64. Under this system, distributed and undistributed profits are taxed at different rates.
This two-rate system is used by Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Greece.
65. Neumark Report, supra note 50, at 3211.03.
66. Van den Tempel Report, Corporation Tax and Individual Income Tax in the
European Communities (Brussels: the Commission, 1970).
67. Robert Goergen, HarmonizationofEnterpriseTaxation in the European Community,
45 BULL. 312, 315 (1991).
68. Sijbren Cnossen, The Case For Tax Diversity in the European Community, 34 EUR.
ECON. REV. 471, 475 (1990).
69. The British, in particular, have vociferously argued that the Community's tax
harmonization proposals are a threat to their national sovereignty because they would
essentially "subordinate market forces to a centralized, political bureaucracy." S. Culp,
Harmonizing the European Economic Community's VA T's Through the Market, I TAX NOTES
INT'L 8, 10-11 (1989). The British government has also argued that coordination of the
various national tax systems is unnecessary to complete the internal market. European Community: U.K. Proposes Market-Based Customs Taxes to Achieve Goal of Single EC Market
by 1992, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1254, 1255 (1988) [hereinafter UK. Proposal];
Cnossen, supra note 68, at 474.
70. Indirect Taxes Are the Focusfor 1992, Scrivener Tells American EnterpriseInstitute,
46 TAX NOTES 1435 (1990).
71.
Denmark, with one of the highest corporate tax rates in the Community, would
experience a loss in tax revenues as a result of tax harmonization. See Removal of Tax
Obstacles, supra note 34, annex 6.
72.
S. van Thiel et al., CorporateIncome Taxation and the Internal Market Without
Frontiers:Adoption of the Mergerand Parent-SubsidiaryDirectives, 29 EUR. TAX'N 326, 327
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Despite this opposition, in 1975 the Commission introduced its own
proposal for corporate tax harmonization73 using the imputation system.74
This proposal met with immediate opposition from the European Parliament
because it lacked any provision for harmonization of taxable bases, a
provision many members saw as essential for full and real harmonization.75
During this period, although no progress was made, the Commission
continued to stress the need for the passage of the Parent-Subsidiary and
Merger Directives.76
Finally, in December of 1977, some success was achieved - not in
corporate tax harmonization or in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, but in a
directive intended to establish greater cooperation between the tax authorities
of the Member States.77 The purpose of this directive was to establish lines
of communication among the Member States to prevent tax avoidance and
evasion. Rarely employed, this directive was of very minor importance.
Ultimately, the Member States preferred to rely on the mechanisms for
preventing tax evasion incorporated in their bilateral tax treaties.78
Very little progress was made over the next seven years, but the
Commission continued to urge the passage of the direct tax proposals,
particularly corporate tax harmonization. In March of 1980 in a report to the
Council, the Commission stated: "[g]iven the role of taxation as an
instrument of economic and social policy, such a move towards alignment [of
corporate taxes] is equally important in the context of national policies and

(1990).
73. Proposal for Counsel Directive Concerning Harmonization of Systems of Company
Taxation and of Withholding Taxes on Dividends, 1975 O.J (C 253) 2. The proposal provided
that Member States should have a corporate tax on profits between 45% and 55% and grant
an imputation credit to shareholders for dividends at a rate of 45% to 55% of the tax the
corporation paid. Id.
74. By this time, with the accession to the Community of Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom, the majority of Member States employed the imputation system. Only
Luxembourg and the Netherlands still used the classical system, while Germany applied the
split-rate method.
75. Joseph W.B. Westerburgen, Tax Harmonizationin the EC-Where Are We and What
Are the Prospects?, 10 INTERTAX 483, 485 (1990).
76. In its 1975 Action Programme for Taxation, the Commission stated that absolute
priority was to be given to the two 1969 proposals on cross-border cooperation. Action
Programme for Taxation, Commission of the European Communities, 1975 O.J. (C 75) 391.
77. Council Directive Concerning Mutual Assistance by the Competent Authorities of
the Member States on the Fields of Direct Taxation and Value Added Taxation, 1976 O.J. (C
76) 119.
78. One critic has charged that the only reason it was adopted in the first place was
because it did not involve the surrender of sovereignty, but rather merely was an attempt to
protect budgetary revenues. See Philip Bentley, Direct Taxation: Whether in the Single
Market of 1992?, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (1990).
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the framing of genuine common policies in the key economic sectors."'7 9
This statement demonstrated two points. First, the Commission continued,
even in the face of a wall of resistance, to press ahead with corporate tax
harmonization. Second, this statement emphasized the Commission's belief
in the inextricable link between tax harmonization and economic union. 0
While difficult to fault the Commission's logic, the Commission's failure
to recognize political realities seems less forgivable. If there was any single
reason for the lack of progress in direct taxation over a fifteen year period,
it was the failure of the Commission to pursue realistic objectives.
In fairness to the Commission, however, the years leading up to 1985
were years of stagnation, not just in the direct taxation area, but in nearly all
Community endeavors. In part because of the increase in the number of
Member States to ten by 1980,8" with relating complications in reaching
decisions by unanimity, as well as the recession and energy crises of the
early 1980s, new proposals proved difficult. It would take the Single
European Act of 1987 to refocus the Community's attention to accomplishing
the objectives of the Treaty of Rome.82
In direct taxation, however, it
would take more: both a change in policy and a "scaling back," on the part
of the Commission.
3.

A Change in Policy and Progress Achieved: 1985-1990

In an effort to get back on track, in June of 1985 the Commission
published the White Paper8 3 intended to outline measures necessary to
complete an "internal market" by 1992. In order to complete a "Europe
without Frontiers," a full 58 of the 228 paragraphs within the White Paper
concerned taxation. The vast majority of this language concerned indirect
79. • Report from the Commission to the Council, Scope for Convergence of Tax Systems
in the Community, 1980 O.J. (C 139) 1.
80. Corporate tax harmonization, it is argued, would prevent distortion of competition
and of capital flows. It would also insure optimum allocation of resources, enhance the
competitive positions of Community industries, reduce administrative costs, and remove one
of the primary incentives for tax avoidance and evasion. See van Theil, supra note 72, at 326.
For the opposing argument, that diversity is beneficial and that the economic and administrative costs created by tax diversity are acceptable, see Cnossen, supra note 68, at 473.
81.
Greece joined the Community in 1980. Treaty of Athens Relating to the Accession
of Greece, 1979 O.J. (L 291) 1.
82. The purpose of the SEA was to infuse "a new political will on the part of the
Member States to fulfill the aims of the Treaty of Rome." SEA, supra note 31, pmbl. The
SEA formally committed the Member States to achieving the goal of the Treaty of Rome--an
internal market-and set a deadline for doing so. Through the SEA, the community was to
have progressively established an internal market by December 31, 1992. Unfortunately, the
SEA's cooperation procedure, which permitted decision-making by qualified majority, does
not extend to fiscal matters such as direct taxation. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
83. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European
Council, COM(85)310 final [hereinafter White Paper].
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taxation, but stressed the need to pass direct taxation proposals that "aim at
removing obstacles to cooperation between European firms. ' ' 4 The proposal
also stated the Commission's intention to publish another white paper on
direct taxation by the end of 1985.85 This pledge, however, never
materialized.
For the next two years proposals on corporate tax harmonization still
continued to circulate within the Commission. Nevertheless, each time a
proposal surfaced the response was flat and the renewed initiative waned.
At this point, the Commission finally recognized the need for a change
in strategy. In April of 1990, it published Guidelines on Company Taxation
which indicated its intention to concentrate on the coordination and
approximation of national laws which give rise to double taxation rather than
on systematic corporate tax harmonization. 86 To demonstrate its commitment to this policy, the Commission formally withdrew the 1975 proposed
pressed for the immediate
directive on harmonization. 7 The report then
88
directives.
three"
of
"package
the
of
passage
At this stage, the chance of progress looked promising. Many of the
issues which had earlier plagued the process of adoption were no longer
obstacles. The physical barriers created by VAT had been removed and the
Community had scaled back its quest for corporate tax harmonization. There
still remained, however, one significant obstacle to reaching the required
unanimity. On the basis of its split-rate corporate tax system, the German
government did not want to entirely give up withholding taxes on outbound
inter-company dividends. For its part, the Dutch government firmly opposed
the existence of any form of withholding taxes. As a result of considerable
pressure from both industry and the Commission, a compromise granted the
German government a partial exemption under specific conditions.8 ' The
last obstacle had been removed. Thereafter, on July 23, 1990, the Council
adopted the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Merger Directive, and the
Arbitration Convention.
III.

THE SCOPE AND INTENT OF THE PARENT-SUBSIDIARY DIRECTIVE

This section contains an analysis of the provisions of the Parent-

84. The primary emphasis of the provisions on indirect taxation was still the elimination
of physical barriers. Id. at 151.

85.

Id. at

150.

86. Guidelines on Company Taxation, supra note 4, at 11.
87. Id. at 10.
88. These directives being the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Merger Directive, and
the Arbitration Convention. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
89. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 5. See infra note 164 and
accompanying text.
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Subsidiary Directive. Before looking at these provisions, however, a brief
discussion of the legal basis -under the EEC Treaty for enacting direct
taxation legislation follows. Next, this article discusses the intent behind the
articles, their scope of application, and certain ambiguities which caused
problems in their interpretation and application. In light of this review, it
will become apparent that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive has an important
impact on existing double taxation treaties both among the Member States
and with non-Community countries. The final part of this discussion will
describe the need for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in light of the existing
framework of intra-EC double taxation treaties and the necessity of a
common Community policy with respect to treaties between Member States
and non-Community countries.
A.

The Legal Basis of Direct Taxation Legislation

As discussed previously, the Community and the Council can adopt
regulations and directives pursuant to Article 189 to carry out their
obligations under the EEC Treaty. Yet before utilizing one of these
legislative measures, the Community must possess competence vis-a-vis the
EEC Treaty in the specific field.90 Otherwise, the ECJ may void legislative
measures taken in areas outside the competence of the Community as ultravires. 91 Because direct taxation has no clearly identifiable legal basis, it is
necessary to rely upon one of the implied powers in the Treaty.
The EEC Treaty contains a specific chapter on taxation. 92 The five
provisions therein, however, deal entirely with indirect taxation. In fact, no
93
provision within the EEC Treaty deals specifically with direct taxation.
Under the general legal theorem expressio unis est exclusio alterius then, a
legal argument can be made that by unequivocally providing for indirect
taxation in the Treaty, while saying nothing of direct taxation, the drafters of
the Treaty intended that direct taxation would remain within the sovereignty
of the Member States.94 Such a narrow reading of the Treaty would deny
90. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 4. Article 4 provides: "Each institution shall act
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty." Id. In addition, there are
two other relevant articles. Article 173 provides the ECJ with jurisdiction in actions against
the Council or Commission based on the grounds of lack of competence and misuse of power.
Id. art. 173. Article 190 establishes a procedural requirement and provides that all regulations,
directives, and decisions of the Council and of the Commission must state the legal basis upon
which they are based. Id. art. 190.

91.
See, e.g., Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493; Case 68/86,
United Kingdom v. Council, 1988 E.C.R. 855.
92. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, arts. 95-99.
93. But see infra notes 95-96 and accompanying discussion of Article 220 (requiring that
collective measures be taken to avoid double taxation, an issue, at least tangentially, of direct
taxation).
94. See, e.g., UK. Proposal,supra note 69, at 1254.
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the Community authority over all direct taxation, however, undoubtedly
undermining the goal of an internal market. The absence of any specific
provision means that the legal basis for direct taxation requires derivation
from one of the articles of the Treaty recognizing broad implied power. Of
course, such an implication must be consistent with the objectives of the
Treaty. The legal basis for enacting direct tax legislation can be inferred
from the three articles in the EEC Treaty: Articles 220, 235, and 100.
Article 220 requires Member States to "enter into negotiations with each
other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals ...the
abolition of double taxation within the Community."95 This article, though
seeming to provide a clear mandate, is relatively obscure and has never been
invoked by the Council as the legal basis for any directive on taxation or
otherwise. In contrast to the relative obscurity of Article 220, Article 235
has been frequently relied upon by the Council to enact legislation where it
does not have explicit power in the EEC Treaty.96 Article 235 provides that
where Community action is determined to be necessary to achieving any of
the objectives of the Community and the Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers, the Community may nevertheless take appropriate
measures so long as it agrees to do so by unanimity. 97 One of the objectives of the Community, as provided in Article 2 of the EEC Treaty, is to
promote the establishment of a common market by "progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States., 98 This can be
construed to include the adoption of direct taxation measures which would
further a common market.
Finally, Article 100 provides that "the Council shall ...issue directives
for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administration action in the Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market." 99 This article provides a
stronger legal basis for direct taxation than Article 235 (and in fact was
ultimately relied upon by the Community in enacting the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive"° ) because it calls for the Community to issue directives
specifically when legislation by the Member States affects the establishment
or functioning of the common market.'' The variations in the method of

95.
EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 220.
96. See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY LAW 104-09 (2d
ed. 1988).
97. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 235.
98. Id. art. 2.
99. Id. art. 100.

100. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1.
101. Moreover, the ECJ has held that where the necessary powers are provided in the
Treaty, and this does not seem to be limited to as explicitly provided, the Commission cannot
rely upon Article 235. See Case 45/86, Commission v. Council, 1987 E.C.R. 1493. Because
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss1/6
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direct taxation of the Member States do affect the functioning of the common
market. As Christiane Scrivener, European Commissioner responsible for
direct taxation matters stated:
Differences in taxation from one EC country to another can influence
the location of investments and thereby distort competition. Thus,
in the case of an investment by a wholly-owned subsidiary, using
funds provided by the parent company, the tax component represents
2.1% of the cost of capital if the subsidiary is located in another EC
country, and only .7% if it is located in the same country.' 02
Under Article 100, the Council must approximate those direct taxation
measures of the Member States which cause distortions in the common
market. This includes the existence of double taxation on repatriated profits
from a subsidiary in one Member State to a parent company in another.
B.

The Provisions of the Parent-SubsidiaryDirective

The Parent Subsidiary Directive, which undoubtedly will have a wideranging impact on businesses and business practice within the Community,
including U.S. and other foreign investors, has only nine articles.'0 3
Member States will then adopt implementing legislation based on these
provisions. The following discussion reviews the scope and the intended
purpose of these nine articles and also several significant uncertainties created
by them.
1. Article 1
Article 1 establishes two important points: first, it limits the geographical
scope of the Directive to ,EC-based companies; second, it provides that the
Directive is not to preclude any agreements on the prevention of fraud or
abuse."° The first paragraph provides that the Directive apples to subsidiaries and parent companies of the Member States. 5 This does not
mean that the Directive applies only to European companies to the exclusion

Article 100 provides the "necessary powers" to enact direct tax legislation, it appears to be
the better legal basis, if not the safer choice.
102. Christiane Scrivener, Taxation Must Not Prevent Companies From TakingAdvantage
of the Single Market, in TARGET 92, at I (The Commission ed. 1992). Similarly, based on

the results of a simulation study and an empirical survey, the Ruding Committee concluded
that "cross-border dividend payments between related companies are the main reason for bias
against inward and outward direct investment." Ruding Report, supra note 56, at 10.
103. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive is provided in full in Annex 1.
104. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
105.

Id.
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of U.S. or other non-Community countries with European operations. Rather,
this innocuous language merely means that the Directive only applies to
subsidiaries and parent companies located within the Community.' 6
Nevertheless, the Directive will have an affect outside the Community to the
extent that Member States have included "most-favored-nation" clauses in
their tax treaties with non-Community countries. 107

Interestingly, Article 1 refers to "distributed profits" rather than dividends
and the standard definition provided in Article 10, paragraph 3 of the OECD
model.'0 8 Because of this, it is uncertain whether the Directive covers
disguised distributions and liquidation distributions. 9 Several commentators have split on this issue." 0 Yet, as Boon and Lambooij point out, the
only limitation on what constitutes a distribution is that it must be "received
by the parent company 'by virtue of its association with its subsidiary."""1
As such, liquidated distributions should qualify under the Directive. This
unclear use of language is unfortunate because such a central issue of what
transactions or payments fall under distributed profits should not turn on the
source and beneficiary in question." 2
Paragraph two provides that the Directive should not preclude the

106. American and other non-Community countries do not, however, automatically
qualify under the Directive, at least without making certain corporate structural changes.
Moreover, at least two Member States have specifically adopted measures as part of their antiabuse provisions to exclude non-Community companies from benefiting under the Directive.
For a full discussion of these points see infra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
107. Germany, for instance, has two such treaties with Sweden and Switzerland that
contain most-favored-nation clauses. See Fred C. de Hosson, The Parent-SubsidiaryDirective,
10 INTERTAX 414, 426 (1990).
108. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, MODEL TAX
CONVENTION (1977) [hereinafter OECD Model].
109. With respect to liquidated distributions, this uncertainty exists only in the context
of Article 5, which, unlike Article 4, does not explicitly exclude liquidation distributions.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, arts. 4, 5. See also infra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.
110. For a discussion opining that disguised distributions and liquidation distributions
should not be included, see Eric Tomsett, The Impact of EC Tax Directives on U.S. Groups
with European Operations, 46 BULL. 123, 129 (1992). For the contrary argument, see de
Hosson, supra note 107, at 433-34.
111.
Robert H. Boon & Machiel V. Lambooij, EC Parent-SubsidiaryDirective: Steps
Towards Harmonization of Direct Taxes, 18 TAX PLAN INT'L REV. 6, 9 (1991). Boon and
Lambooij conclude that if a Member State determines, for example, that an interest payment
between a subsidiary and parent is not made at arm's length, then the excessive part of that
interest should not be subject to taxation. Id. This anomalous result seems to be correct in
light of the clumsy use of "distributions" rather than dividends. In practice, however, it would
seem that existing anti-abuse provisions would prevent the excessive amounts from qualifying
under the Directive.
112. Unfortunately, this is exactly what has happened. Some Member States have defined
distributed profits so broadly as to include nearly all distributions, while others have limited
the terms strictly to dividends. See infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
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application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the
prevention of fraud or abuse." 3 "Domestic provisions" refers to existing
general domestic tax law measures1 14 as well as judicial rules of abuse such
as the Netherlands' fraus legis and the U.K.'s substance over form rules. 5
"Agreement-based" provisions refers to anti-abuse provisions contained in the
Member States' various double taxation treaties. Unfortunately, no language
within the Directive or in any explanatory statement defines or distinguishes
the terms "fraud" and "abuse" as used in this paragraph.
Paragraph two did not exist in the original 1969 draft and its inclusion
in the current Directive has caused some concern. The criticism is that too
free a reign to interpret the anti-fraud provisions will result in the adoption
by the Member States of inconsistent implementing legislation." 6 Some
Member States have already interpreted this provision to permit them to
preclude EC-based parent companies where the ultimate owner is a nonCommunity person or entity from being exempt from withholding taxes." 7
These provisions are not necessary to prevent fraud or abuse, but are merely
efforts on the part of a Member State to reduce the scope of the Directive
and thereby protect tax revenues." 8 These unilateral initiatives are of
dubious legality and one of several areas in which the Commission must
adopt a common policy.
2.

Article 2

This article establishes the three requirements in order to qualify as a
"company of a Member State." These requirements are: first, that the
company is based on one of the corporate forms recognized in the specific
Member State and provided for in the Directive;" 9 second, the company

113.
114.

Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 1(2).

OTMAR THOMMES & RIJKELE BETTEN, EC CORPORATE TAX LAW: COMMENTARY
ON THE EC DIRECT TAX MEASURES AND MEMBER STATE IMPLEMENTATION ch. 6.1,
19 (1st

ed. 1991 & Supp. 1992).
115. Nick Raby, National Implementation of the Parent-SubsidiaryDirective: Some
Problems and Opportunities Identified, 4 EC TA REv. 216, 220 (1992); de Hosson, supra

note 107, at 427.
116. See Peter H. Schonewille, Some Questions on the Parent-SubsidiaryDirective and
the Merger Directive, I INTERTAX 13 (1992).
117. France and Spain have adopted such legislation. See infra notes 251-59 and

accompanying text.
118. It is just one of several examples where the Member States have gone too far in
interpreting the Directive. See infra note 262-65 and accompanying text.

119. These corporate forms are as follows:
(a) Belgium: soci6t6 anonyme/naamloze vennootschap; soci6t6 en commandite par
actions/commsnfitsire vennootschap op aandelen; soci6t6 priv6e A responsabilit6
limit6e/besloten venootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid; and those public law
bodies that operate under private law;
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is considered (pursuant to the tax laws of a Member State) to be resident in
that State for tax purposes and, furthermore, is not considered to be a resident
for tax purposes outside the Community under the terms of a double taxation
agreement concluded with a third state; and third, the company is subject to
a corporate tax of one of the Member States. 2 '
The first requirement is straightforward. In the 1969 version of the
Directive, no annex listed the acceptable corporate forms within each of the
Member States; rather, the 1969 version simply required "corporations and
associations subject to a corporation tax."'12 1 The inclusion of an annex in
the Directive reduced the number of business forms that now qualify, with

(b) Denmark: aktieselskab; anpartssekskab;
(c) Germany: Aktiengesellschaft; Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien; Gesellschaft
mit beschrankter Haftung; befgrechtliche Gewerkschaft mit eigener Rechtsperrnlichkeit;
(d) Spain: sociedad an6nima; sociedad comanditaria por acciones; sociedad de
responsabilidad limitada; and those public bodies that operate under private law;
(e) France: socirt6 anonyme; socirt6 en commandite par actions; soci~t6 A
responsabilit6 limitde; and industrial and commercial public establishments and
undertakings;
(f) Ireland: registered Building Societies; and registered Industrial and Provident
Societies;
(g) Italy: societA per azioni; societA in accomandita par azioni; societA a responsabilitA limitata; and public and private entities carrying on industrial and
commercial activities;
(h) Luxembourg: socit6 anima; soci&t6 en commandaite par actions; socirt6 A
responsabilit6 limitre;
(i) The Netherlands: naamloze vennootschap; besloten venootschap mat beperkte
aansprakelijheid;
(j) Portugal: commercial companies or civil law companies having commercial form;
co-operatives and public undertakings incorporated pursuant to Portuguese law; and
(k) United Kingdom: companies incorporated under the law of the United Kingdom.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, Annex.
120. The specific corporate taxes, as provided for in the Directive itself (and to which
there exists no possibility of an option or an exemption) are the following:
(a) Belgium: imp6t des socirt~s/vennootschapsbelasting;
(b) Denmark: selskabssat;
(c) Germany: Krrperschaftsteur;
(d) Spain: impuesto sobre sociedades;
(e) France: imp6t sur les socirt~s;
(f)Ireland: corporation tax;
(g) Italy: imposta sul reddito delle persone giurdiche;
(h) Luxembourg: imp6t sur le revenue des collectivites;
(i) The Netherlands: vennootschapsbelasting;
(j) Portugal: imposto sobre o rendimento das pessoas colectivas;
(k) United Kingdom: corporation tax.
Id. art. 2.
121.
Explanatory Memorandum to the 1969 Draft Parent-Subsidiary Directive. See
Unofficial English Translation in Supplemental Service to European Taxation, No. 7, July
1969 [hereinafter 1969 Explanatory Memorandum].
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the most notable exclusion being that of the limited partnership. 2 2 In
Ireland in particular, the effect of the annex is to exclude two important
corporate forms, namely, the unlimited incorporated company and various
unincorporated bodies. These include clubs, associations, and charities
subject to Ireland's corporation tax.' 23 There is some indication that the
present limitations on qualifying company forms may run afoul of the antidiscrimination provisions in the EEC Treaty, because companies not
included face an obvious competitive disadvantage. 24 In fact, if the
Commission fails to expand this annex, 21 the issue may fall to the ECJ.
The second requirement is intended to exclude those companies which
constitute "dual resident" companies pursuant to a tax treaty concluded with
a non-Community state. 126 Thus, a Belgian parent company incorporated
under laws of Belgium with subsidiaries in Denmark, but with its
management and control in the United States and considered a resident in the
United States under a Belgian-U.S. tax treaty, cannot claim the exemption
from Danish withholding taxes on dividends to be repatriated to the Belgian
parent company. It is important to recognize the scope of this provision: it
only excludes companies which are considered to be resident outside the
Community based on a tax treaty with a non-Community country. It does
not preclude, however, companies that are resident both in the Community
and outside the Community which are, for the purposes of the Directive,
considered to be companies'of a Member State. 127 Finally, in order to
determine residency, most Member States have indicated that they will rely
on the "tie-breaker" clauses contained in the applicable double taxation
28
treaties, or where one does not exist, on Article 4 of the OECD Model.
The third requirement is intended to apply to holding companies and
investment companies which are not subject to corporate tax in the countries
where they have their registered office. 29 In particular, the Commission
intended this requirement to precliude holding companies registered under

122. One of the recommendations of the Ruding Committee was that this provision
should be expanded to include all enterprises subject to corporate income tax, regardless of
their business form. Ruding Report, supra note 56, at 28. In its June 1992 response, the
Commission agreed with this recommendation and stated its intention to submit proposals to
expand this language. Commission to the Council and to Parliament, SEC(92) 1118 final of
26 June 1992,
34, 15 [hereinafter June Communication].
123. M. Roger Moore, Commentary on the Implementation of the EC Direct Tax
Measures in Republic of Ireland, in THOMMEs & BETrEN, supra note 114, ch 2.31 95.
124. B.H. ter Kuile, European Communities: Taxation, Discriminationand the Internal
Market, 32 EUR. TAX'N 402, 403 (Dec. 1992).
125. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
126. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(b).
127. Schonewille, supra note 116, at 16.
128.
OECD Model, supra note 108, art 4.
129.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 2(c).
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1 30
Luxembourg law (loi du 33 juillet 1929) that face no corporate tax.
Other companies which this requirement is designed to exclude are Dutch
investment companies known as Beleggingsintellingen and German
investment companies known as Kapitalanlagegessellschaften.3 ' Also to
be excluded are transparent Spanish and Portuguese companies. These
companies are supposed to be taxed, but are exempt if and to the extent their
profits are taxed in the hands of their shareholders. 132 Finally, in order to
qualify as a company of a Member State, a company need not satisfy all
three requirements in any one Member State. 133 Thus, a company incorporated in the U.K., resident for tax purposes in Germany, and subject to
French corporate tax, qualifies under the Directive.

3.

Article 3

Article 3 defines what constitutes a parent company and also provides
two optional derogations from one of the primary requirements.134 The
Article states that a parent company is "at least" any company which meets
the requirements of Article 2 and has a minimum holding of 25 % in the
capital of a company which also satisfies the requirements of Article 2 of
another Member State.33 The inclusion of the words "at least" within the
definition of parent company means that the above requirements are the
maximum standards for qualifying as a parent company and that individual
Member States can implement more liberal legislation. For example, the
Netherlands and Belgium require only 5% participation, while others, such
as Germany and Luxembourg, opt for higher participation but still less than
the maximum 25%.136
Article 3 also provides two important possible derogations from the 25%

130. de Hosson, supra note 107, at 429. Luxembourg has recently passed new legislation
for a holding company (Socit6 de participationfinancieres), which appears to qualify under
the Directive, and thus may once again make Luxembourg a good location for establishing a
European holding company. For a full discussion of this point, see infra notes 294-302 and
accompanying text.
131. de Hosson, supra note 107, at 429.
132. Id.
133. See Boon & Lambooiji, supra note 11, at 7.
134. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1,art. 3.
135. In 1969, there was a significant degree of variation in the Member States' taxation
systems with regard to minimum participation amounts. They ranged from just one share
requirement in Belgium to 25% in Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In analyzing
whether economic double taxation should be avoided only in cases where there is substantial
participation, the Commission recognized that arguments existed both for and against. 1969
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 122, at 3. In the end, however, it took the position that
the Directive should apply at least in cases of participation of 20% or more. 1969 Draft
Directive, supra note 60, art. 3(l)(a). The 1990 Directive increased this to at least 25%.
136. See infra notes 228-40 and accompanying text.
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participation requirement: first, the Member States may, through bilateral
agreements, replace the participation requirement with that of holding voting
rights; second, the Member States can choose not to apply the Directive to
companies of a Member State which do not maintain holdings qualifying
them as a parent company for an uninterrupted period of a least two
years. 37 The U.K. pushed for the inclusion of the voting rights alternative,
probably to facilitate stapled-stock arrangements. 38 The second derogation
met the concerns of some Member States that "the privileged treatment might
of the shares of subsidiaries which have
be abused through the quick resale
' 39
been acquired or subscribed."'
Article 3's ambiguities have engendered considerable criticism.
Commentators have charged that the 25% holding requirement is both overly
simplistic, as it fails to recognize differing classes of shares with various
voting rights, 40 and will tend to encourage concentrations.' 41 Moreover,
it remains uncertain whether indirect ownership of the 25% participation will
qualify under the Directive. For example, if an Italian company owns all the
stock of a Spanish company, and these two companies in turn own 15% and
85% respectively of the stock of a Dutch company, it is uncertain whether
the Directive would apply to the Italian company because of the 15%
ownership in the Dutch company even though there is 100% control.
Because total control exists, the Directive should apply in this situation as
well.

142

In addition, the two year holding period option, adopted to alleviate the
Member States' concerns of potential fraud, appears excessive in light of the
existence of the anti-abuse provision in Article 1(2). It also remains
uncertain exactly when this holding period should begin and end, and thus
whether the parent company must have held the qualifying participation for
the two year period before the dividend payment or may satisfy the
requirement by retaining the participation after the dividend payment. To
date, the Netherlands, France and Belgium have provided in their implementing legislation that they will apply the period retroactively. 143 However,
137. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
138. Interview with Eric Tomsett, International Tax Partner, Touche Ross, London, in
London, England (Dec. 29, 1992).
1969 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 121, at 3.
139.
140. Thus a 25% holding of non-voting stock may qualify as a parent-subsidiary
relationship under the directive. See de Hosson, supra note 107, at 430
Bridgette Knobbe-Keuk, The EC Corporate Tax Directives-Anti-Abuse Provisions,
141.
DirectEffect, German Implementation Law, 9 INTERTAX 486 (1992). The Ruding Committee
has also recommended that a substantial reduction in the participation exemption would be
desirable. Ruding Report, supra note 56, at 29.
142. For the argument that the Directive should not apply in this situation, see de Hosson,
supra note 107, at 430.
143. See infra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
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legislation which only takes a retrospective view at the time of the dividend
payment does not seem consistent with the language of the Directive which
states "do not maintain for an uninterrupted period" rather than "did
not."'"

4.

Article 4

Article 4 requires the Member States where the parent company is
located to either exempt repatriated profits from the subsidiary or apply a
credit method. 45
If a Member adopts the exemption method, that
exemption, of course, must be total. If the Member State adopts the credit
method, it may tax the repatriated profits, but must allow the parent company
to deduct from its tax bill the fraction of corporate tax paid by the subsidiary.
Article 4 is certainly not a novel innovation, as it generally reaffirms ideas
contained in the double taxation treaties among the Member States and with
third countries. Yet, the network of intra-Community double taxation treaties
as late as 1990 remained incomplete, 1" so in this respect, Article 4
standardized this common provision.
The original treatment of liquidated profits under the Directive partially
addressed the concentration issue mentioned above. The 1969 draft provided
that liquidated profits qualified for exemption under the Directive.'47 At
the time the Commission reasoned that liquidated profits merited exemption
because the element of taxation should not obstruct the liquidation of the
subsidiary.14 Since then, however, the Commission reversed itself and has

144. See Jan A.G. van der Geld, Some General Problems in the Implementation of the
Parent-SubsidiaryDirective,4 EC TAX REv. 224, 226 (1992); Knobbe-Keuk, supra note 141,
at 487; see also supra note 268 and accompanying text.
145. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 4. It was because of Ireland and the
U.K. that Member States were given the option of choosing an exemption or credit method.
Both of these Member States employ the foreign tax credit method for eliminating double
taxation and include dividends in taxable income. Some critics have charged that Member
States should not have been permitted to select the credit method because this method is more
technically complex to apply, and, more important, fails to achieve capital export neutrality.
See, e.g., de Hosson, supra note 107, at 419. This criticism, however, fails to recognize that
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive was ultimately passed in the Council only after the Member
States' compromise over relatively minor issues. Whether compromise could have been
reached were the United Kingdom and Ireland. required to change entirely from credit to an
exemption method is highly unlikely. In any event, paragraph three of the Article implies that
his choice provided to the Member States is only meant to be temporary until the time a "real
common system of corporate income tax" is in force. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note
1, art. 4(3). While such an event is certainly not foreseeable within the immediate future, the
findings of the Ruding Committee have reaffirmed the necessity that it be attained at some
point. Ruding Report, supra note 56, at 13.
146. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
147. 1969 Draft Directive, supra note 60, art. 4.
148.
1969 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 121, at 3.
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49
explicitly provided in Article 4 that liquidated profits are not exempt.1
Because the purpose of the Directive was to facilitate cross-border concentrations, the unwinding of those concentrations is likely simply an event
which operates against that purpose.
Paragraph 2 of Article 4 provides that each Member State retains the
option to determine that "any changes relating to the holding and the parent
cannot deduct any losses resulting from the distribution of the profits of the
subsidiary may not be deducted from the taxable profits of the parent
company."'' 0 In practice, this has two implications. First, as far as charges
relating to the holding, this simply means that if the exemption method is
applied, only net profits are exempt.' 5' This allows Member States such
as Belgium and France to continue to impose management costs based on a
fixed percentage so long as the fixed costs do not exceed 5% of the
dividends received. 2 Second, the losses resulting from distribution of
profits refers to the situation where the share values held by the parent
company falls after distribution of profits by the subsidiary to the parent
company. 53 This, of course, is not a loss so much as a reduction in book
value.
As will be discussed in the next section, Article 5 contains exceptions to
the application of the Directive for Germany, Portugal, and Greece. Under
the exceptions, these three countries are permitted to impose a withholding
tax on dividends for a limited period.' 54 As a result, Article 4, paragraph
2 requires that Member States which opt for the credit method must give the
parent companies a tax credit for the amount of the withholding tax levied
against the subsidiary by any of these three Member States "up to the limit
of the corresponding domestic tax."' 5'5

5. Article 5
Article 5 is the single most important provision in the Directive and
represents a departure from existing practice in both double taxation treaties
and national legislation. Article 5 provides that the Member States where the
subsidiary is located must exempt from the withholding taxes profits

149.

Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(1). There is no similar explicit

exclusion of liquidated profits in Article 5. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
150. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 4(2).
151. But see THOMMES & BETTEN, supra note 114, ch. 6.4 28 (stating that in practice

these changes will not only include the management costs but also the cost incurred in
refinancing the capital investment in the subsidiary).
152. Id. at 29.
153. Id. at 30.
154. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2)-(4).
155.

Id. art. 4(2).
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distributed to its parent company from the withholding taxes. 5 6 While
double taxation treaty arrangements reduce high statutory withholding rate on
dividends, a level of taxation nevertheless remains. Article 5 goes further by
entirely, representing an important departure from
exempting dividends
57
current practice.
Article 5 includes three exceptions for Greece, Germany, and Portugal to
the application of this provision. 58 These exceptions were adopted because
of budgetary concerns with respect to Portugal, and in light of existing taxing
systems in Germany and Greece.' 59 The exceptions are specific to each
Member State and have different requirements and duration.
Greece has an exemption because of its extreme split-rate corporate tax
system. In Greece, resident companies are not taxed on profits paid to
shareholders, but they must withhold taxes at rates of between 42% and
50%. 16° The tax on retained profits is 46%.16' To balance this system,
Greece then applies significant withholding taxes on dividends distributed to
foreign parent companies. The exception extended to Greece provides that
it may continue to levy a withholding tax on profits distributed to parent
companies of other Member States so long as it does not charge a corporate
tax on distributed profits. 162 This paragraph further provides that the rate
of the withholding tax must not exceed the lowest rate provided for in
bilateral double taxation agreements with any individual Member State.'63
Finally, unlike the exemptions provided for Germany and Portugal, the
exemption for Greece does not contain any time limit. Nevertheless, this
exemption does not actually have indefinite duration, as Greece will
eventually have to comply fully with the terms of the Directive.
The Directive also provides Germany an exemption because of its splitrate corporate tax system. Its exception in Article 5 provides that Germany
may impose a withholding tax of 5% on profits distributed by its subsidiary
companies until mid-1996 so long as it charges a corporate tax on distributed
profits at a rate at least eleven points lower than the rate applied to retained

156.
Id. art. 5(1). The parent company, of course, must satisfy the requirements of the
Directive as adopted by the particular Member State.
157. For a discussion of these and other competitive effects of the Directive, see infra
notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2)-(4).
158.
159. Id. pmbl.; THOMMES & BETrEN, supra note 114, ch. 6.6 1.1.
160. Rijkele Betten, European Communities, Implementation of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive in the Member States, 32 EuR. TAx'N 130, 147 (1992).
Id.
161.
162. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
163. Id. The lowest existing rate contained in any double taxation treaty between Greece
and a Member State is with Belgium and provides for 25% tax. ERNST & YOUNG,
WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE AND DIRECTORY 123 (1991).
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profits. "
The third exemption to Portugal was given primarily because of
budgetary reasons. Under this exemption, Portugal may impose a withholding tax not to exceed 15% in the first five years and 10% in the next three
years on profits from its subsidiaries which are to be repatriated to parent
companies in other Member States. 165 The exception further provides that
it may only be extended after the eight year period by a unanimous decision
of the Council.' 6
6.

Articles 6 & 7

These two Articles were adopted to address specific situations in the
Member States which are inconsistent with the intent of the Directive.
Article 6 provides that the Member State of the parent company may not
charge a withholding tax on the profits received by the parent company from
a subsidiary. 67 This is intended specifically for the Belgian tax system,
which prior to the Directive imposed a 10% withholding tax on dividends
received by Belgian companies.1 68 This Article does not, of course, prevent
the Member State from imposing a withholding tax when the dividends
received by the parent company are redistributed to shareholders.
Article 7 further defines withholding tax and provides that the Directive
not affect domestic and agreement-based provisions to eliminate double
taxation. 69 This Article provides that the term "withholding tax" does not
include either an advance payment or prepayment of corporate tax to the
Member States of the subsidiary done in connection with a distribution of
profits of the parent company. ° Thus, the U.K. and Ireland's advance
corporate tax system and France and Italy's prepayment system (prdcompte)
are not affected by the Directive and they may continue to impose equalization and other taxes in accordance with their imputation systems.' 7'
7.

Articles 8 & 9

Article 8 establishes the deadline for implementation, January 1, 1992.
It then requires the Member States to notify the Commission of its

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(3).
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 6.
THOMMES & BETrEN, supra note 114, ch. 6.6 2.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
Id.
6, 7.
THOMMES & BETrEN, supra note 114, ch. 6.7
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compliance. 72 Although the Directive is binding, Member States have
discretion in implementation.' 73 Article 9 provides that the Directive
imposes an obligation only on the Member States. But this provision does
not necessarily shield the Directive from having direct effect. 74
C.

The Impact of the Directive on Double Taxation Treaties

The Parent-Subsidiary directive has an impact on existing bilateral double
taxation treaties both among the Member States and with third countries.
With respect to the existing framework of intra-Community double taxation
treaties, some of the provisions of the Directive appear repetitive. Nevertheless, the Directive goes a long way towards simplifying and unifying the
protection provided in the treaties. It also further reduces the cost of
repatriating profits from the subsidiary of one Member State to the parent
company of another. The double taxation treaties with non-Community
countries pose a potential problem in that differing clauses will create
distortions that can undermine the purpose of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
As a result, the Commission must adopt a common policy on double taxation
treaties between individual Member States and non-Community coun175
tries.
1. Double Taxation Treaties Among the Member States
The provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive do not differ greatly
from the protections against double taxation already included in the numerous
double taxation treaties among the Member States. The Directive, however,
furthers protections through simplicity and uniformity. It also should provide
176
the foundation for additional efforts at harmonizing corporate taxation.

172. In the original 1969 Draft, Member States were also specifically required to submit
their proposed implementing legislation to the Commission for its comments. 1969 Draft
Directive, supra note 60, art. 9. The absence of this provision in the 1990 Directive is
unfortunate because it could have precluded some of the problems and inconsistencies which
have arisen and that will most likely have to be resolved through the ECJ. See infra notes
209-59 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
174. When the Directive does have direct effect, the Member States that have failed to
adopt implementing legislation within the prescribed time or have incorrectly adopted
implementing legislation may be liable to individuals and entities through the national courts.
See infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
175.
It should be noted that, at this time, the Directive in no way replaces a Member
State's existing framework of double taxation treaties, with either other Member States or nonCommunity countries. The significance of this is that, to the extent a company is unable to
qualify under the Directive, the company may still seek the reduced rate in the applicable
double taxation treaty between its country of origin and that of the country, where its
subsidiary is located.
176. June Communication, supra note 122, at 1.
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The Community's twelve Member States could conclude a possible sixtysix double taxation treaties. Of the possible sixty-six, however, only fiftyseven have been concluded. 77 Thus, the Directive promises to harmonize
throughout the Community the protection against double taxation of
repatriated profits. Moreover, even though this existing framework-of treaties
helps reduce withholding taxes on dividends, it does not reduce them
entirely. 78 The reduced rates are still at five, ten, or even 15%.179 The
Directive will harmonize the variety of withholding tax rates and affiliation
exemptions in the existing fifty-seven treaties. In so doing, the Directive will
reduce further the cost of distributing profits within the Community. 80
Moreover, the Directive should simplify and expedite the repatriation of
profits between subsidiary and parent companies. Under the double taxation
treaty arrangements prior to the Directive, companies still had to pay the
withholding tax and then receive a refund. Under the Directive, withholding
tax will be exempt at source. 18 Nevertheless, while the Community's
direct taxation measures and particularly the Parent-Subsidiary Directive are
significant, they only affect cross-border transactions. For this reason, the
Directive cannot replace the existing bilateral double taxation treaties among
the Member States.
2.

Double Taxation Treaties Between Member States
and Non-Community Countries

The EC's tax policy, direct taxation measures, and existing double
taxation treaties with third countries may be problematic. The problem is
that differing clauses create advantages and incentives within these double
taxation agreements with non-Community countries which may result in
discrimination within the internal market against companies which are
177. A bilateral double taxation agreement does not cover relations between these
Member States:
Denmark - Greece; Greece - Spain; Greece - Ireland; Greece - Luxembourg;
Greece - Portugal; Spain - Ireland; Portugal - Luxembourg; Portugal - the Netherlands;
Portugal - Ireland. Guidelines on Company Taxation, supra note 4, Annex I.
178. Tomsett, supra note 110, at 129.
179. Id.
180. As the Commission itself explained,
[a]lthough bilateral double taxation agreements have in some cases helped to reduce
the extent of these obstacles, they are far from providing a satisfactory answer to the
requirement of the internal market. This is because they do not cover all bilateral
relations between Member States, they do not achieve complete abolition of double
taxation and, in particular, they never provide any uniform solution for triangular
and multilateral relations between Member States.
Guidelines on Company Taxation, supra note 4, at 3.
181.
Malcolm Finney & Joseph Lurie, European Opportunities, 129 TAX'N 258, 259
(1992).
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otherwise in an equivalent market position. 82 For example, where two
Member States have a double taxation treaty with the same non-Community
country, one applying a full participation exemption for dividends received
and the other only a partial exemption, competition between parent
companies within the EC will mean a result contrary to the intent of the
Directive.'8 3 To avoid these problems, existing double taxation agreements
will require renegotiation based on a common policy as established by the
Commission. Whether the Commission has the authority to promulgate such
a common policy depends on whether it has external competence in direct
taxation matters. Based on the principles for recognizing external competence as laid down by the ECJ, the Community does have this authority.
The EEC Treaty confers external powers to the Community in several
areas;"8 however, this does not include taxation. Nevertheless, the ECJ has
held that external competence can exist notwithstanding the absence of
specific Treaty language.185 In the European Road Transport Agreement
case, the ECJ stated that to determine whether the Community has external
competence, it must consider the general system of Community law with
respect to third countries.'86 The ECJ went on to state that whenever the
Community adopts a provision to advance a common policy envisaged by the
Treaty, the Member States "no longer have the right, acting individually or
even collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect

182.

These differences in double taxation treaties are obviously one of the major factors

that the U.S. and other non-Community countries should consider in choosing a sire for a
European holding company that would permit them to take advantage of the Directive. See
infra notes 283-93 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the long-term effect of these
differing clauses could prevent the Parent-Subsidiary Directive from achieving its full
potential, which in turn could discourage other EC direct tax initiatives. This would have a
negative impact on both EC and non-Community businesses with European operations. In
response, the Ruding Committee recommended harmonizing tax treaty provisions in those
areas, such as withholding taxes on dividends, that cause discrimination within the
Community. Ruding Report, supra note 56, at 11.
183. Hubert Hamaekers, Corporate Tax Policy and Competence of the European
Community: An EC Tax Convention with Non-Member States, 30 EuR. TAX'N 358, 360
(1990).
184. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, arts. 111 (common policy on external trade); 113
(common policy on tariff rates, tariff and trade agreements, export policy, protection of trade,
and antidumping measures); 114 (explicitly providing the Community competence for Articles
111 and 113); 228 (concluding agreements with non-Community states and international
organizations pursuant to the Treaty); 231 (conducting relations with the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation); and 238 (concluding agreements with third states or
international organizations to establish association involving reciprocal rights and obligations).
185. Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355; Opinion 1/76 Draft Agreement Establishing a
European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741; Opinion 1/78
International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979 E.C.R. 2871; Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76,
Cornelis Kramer and Others, 1976 E.C.R. 1270.
186. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 264.
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these rules."' 87 The preamble to the Directive states that the Directive is
based on Article 100 of the EEC Treaty. Article 100 provides that the EC
may take measures to advance the "establishment and functioning of the
common market."'8 8 As the Community has adopted legislation which
advances a common policy envisaged under the Treaty, that is, the
elimination of double taxation on repatriated profits to encourage cross-border
concentrations, the Member States no longer have competence in this area.
Thus, as the differing clauses within bilateral double taxation treaties with
non-Community countries may cause distortions that undermine the Directive,
and as the Community has external competence in direct taxation, the
Community should adopt a common policy towards these treaties with third
countries. The question is not really whether the Community has the
competence to adopt such a common policy, because it clearly does; the
question is whether it will. Hamaekers is one of several commentators who
has recommended that the Commission promulgate a standard EC tax
convention with non-Community states. 8 9 The Commission, however, still
smarting from its earlier failures in direct taxation because of overreaching,
has taken an overly cautious approach to adopting a common policy. In
response to the Ruding Committee's recommendation to adopt a common
policy towards these treaties,' 9 the Commission stated that while it agreed
in principle, it thought that the principle of subsidiarity dictated action only
in those fields of major interest to the Community.' 9' The Commission did
state, however, that it would take "further steps" consistent with the
recommendation of the Committee. 92 This still falls short of adopting a
common policy.' 93
IV.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE

By January 1, 1992, all of the Member States, including those states
which were granted exemptions, were to have adopted implementing
legislation to comply with the provisions of the Directive.'94 To date,

187. Id.
188. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 100. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text.
189. Hamaekers, supra note 183, at 361.
190. Ruding Report, supra note 56, at 32. But see Otmar Thdmmes, Commentary on the
6
Parent-SubsidiaryDirective, in EC CORPORATE TAX LAW, supra note 114, ch. 6.1
(arguing that the more favorable provisions contained in certain Member States' bilateral
double taxation treaties do not violate Community law).
191.
June Communication, supra note 122, at 34.
192. Id.at 36.
193. The Commission did state that it would review these taxation treaties to ensure that
they are in accordance with non-discrimination rules of the EEC Treaty. Id. 35.
194. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 8.
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eleven Member States have adopted such legislation while the other has
introduced a bill into its national legislature. As a result of the brevity of the
Directive's instructions and the resulting flexibility Member States have in
implementation, combined with the anti-abuse provision of Article 1(2), some
significant differences in Member qualifications under the Directive have
emerged. Some of these differences are well within the discretion allowed
to Member States; other measures seem inconsistent with the Directive.
While these deviations obviously have significance from tax planning
perspective, they also have significance in the event the ECJ determines that
the Directive has direct effect. In such a case, a Member State might be
liable for damage suffered by individuals and legal entities for their failure
to adopt implementing legislation consistent with the requirements of the
Directive. The first section of this chapter discusses the issue of the direct
effect of the Directive. The second section of this chapter will then look at
the primary aspects of the implementing laws that have been adopted by the
Member States. Finally, the last section will review specific aspects of
particular Member States' implementing legislation which appears to go
beyond what the language of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive warrants.
A. Direct Effect of the Directive
Should the ECJ determine that the Parent-Subsidiary Directive has direct
effect, individuals and legal entities will have recourse to their national
courts. They can sue a Member State that has failed either to adopt
legislation within the prescribed deadline or to adopt correctly the necessary
implementing legislation. 195 In the process of adopting implementing
legislation, some Member States have unilaterally determined that their
existing legislation complies with part or all of the Directive, while some
other Member States have included provisions within their implementing
legislation which appear inconsistent with the requirements of the Directive. 196 If these decisions prove incorrect, the potential direct effect of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive is of critical importance.1 97 Over the past thirty
years, the ECJ has created a well-reasoned and comprehensive body of case
law on the potential direct effect of Community directives.19 s Based on
195. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southhampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth.
(Teaching), 1986 E.C.R. 723; Case 102/79, Commission v. Belgium, 1980 E.C.R. 1473, 1487;
Case 51/76, Enka BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen Ondernemingen v.
Inspecteur der Invoerrechtenen Accijnzen, 1977 E.C.R. 2203, 2212.
196. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
If direct effect is found to exist, it will exist from the time the directive was
197.
supposed to have been implemented, that is, January 1, 1992.
198. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1; Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964
E.C.R. 585; Case 9/70, Grad v. Finanzant Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825; Case 41/74, van Duyn
v. Home Office, 1973 E.C.R. 1337; Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R.
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this case authority as well as the language of the Directive itself, it appears
that the Directive does have direct effect.
As far back as 1974, the ECJ has stated that while Article 189 explicitly
provides that regulations are directly applicable, and thus by their very nature
have direct effect, this does not alone prevent directives from also having
direct effect. 99 In Marshall v. Southhampton & South West Hampshire
Area Health Authority (Teaching), the ECJ held that where the subject matter
of a directive appears unconditional and sufficiently precise, individuals may
rely upon those provisions against the State when the State fails to implement
the directive in national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it
fails to implement the directive correctly. 200 Thus, the analysis turns on
whether the Directive defines the obligation of the Member States in
unconditional and sufficiently precise terms and whether the Directive intends
to confer benefits on individuals.
The language of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, though admittedly not
a perfectly drafted legal document, nevertheless is concise and clear. The
ambiguities in the Directive do not detract from its central objective, to
encourage cross-border transactions by eliminating withholding taxes in the
Member States of the subsidiary (Article 4) and providing either an
exemption or a credit in the Member State of the parent company (Article
2
5). 01
In addition, Article 2 also establishes those entities which are to be
the intended beneficiaries.2 2
Thus, Articles 4 and 5 impose clear
obligations on Member States in what they can and cannot tax while Article
2 specifies exactly who should benefit. The Directive's simplicity makes it
directly effective.
Some commentators have argued that the fact that Member States may
opt for either the credit or exemption method in Article 4 should preclude the
existence of direct effect, at least where this particular Article applies. 0 3
But Hamaekers points out the discretion provided in Article 4 should in no
way provide an obstacle to direct effect, because these methods, in either

1629; Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzant Miinster-Innestadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53; Case 14/83, von
Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891.
199. Case 51/76, Nederlandse Onderneminger, 1977 E.C.R. 126 ("It would be
incompatible with the binding effect which Article 189 ascribes to directives to exclude on
principle the possibility of the obligation imposed by them being relied on by persons
concerned.").
200. 1986 E.C.R. 723, 748.
201. The uncertainties created by the Directive, as discussed in III.B.1-7, causes
inconveniences for investors and tax planners and may ultimately prevent the Directive from
achieving its full potential, but do not undermine the document's overall precision or central
objectives.
202. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1,art. 2. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
203. Schonewille, supra note 116, at 13; Boon & Lambooij, supra note 111, at 11.
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form, already exist in the domestic legislation of the Member States.2°
Essentially, though not without some uncertainties, the Directive remains a
brief concise legal document, with a very clear purpose. Consequently, it has
direct effect.
For investors and tax planners, the significance of the direct effect of the
Directive is that where a Member State's implementing legislation is
inconsistent with the Directive and causes injury through additional or
continued taxation, individuals have recourse through their national courts
against that Member State. As we shall see in the next two sections, there
are provisions within the implementing legislation adopted by some Member
States that do appear to be inconsistent with the Directive.
B.

Member State Implementation

Member States have a great deal of discretion in adopting implementing
legislation under a directive. In the case of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,
this flexibility has resulted in considerable differences in certain key areas of
the provisions, some of which appear consistent with the Directive, while
others seem less so. These variations in implementing legislation have
significance to both tax planners and investors. The following discussion
reviews the legislation adopted among the Community members covering six
key aspects of the Directive.
1. Status of Implementation
Eleven of the twelve Member States (excepting only Greece) have
adopted implementing legislation and notified the Commission of their
compliance pursuant to Article 8 of the Directive. 205 The taxation systems
of these eleven Member States require various levels of adjustment to
implement the Directive, with the U.K. probably requiring the least
modification of all. 20 6 Greece has not yet adopted implementing legisla-

204.
Hubert Hamaekers, The EC on the Brink ofFull Corporate Tax Harmonization?,32
EuR. TAX'N 102 (1992).
Belgium: Law of 23 Oct. 1991 (Official Gazette of 15 Nov. 1991) and Royal Decree
205.
of 14 Oct. 1991 (Official Gazette of 23 Oct. 1991); Denmark: Law 219 of 3 Apr. 1991;
Germany: Law of Oct. 1991; Spain: Law 18/1991 of 6 June 1991 which amends the
Corporation Tax Law and Implementation Law 29/1991 of 17 Dec. 1991; France: Article 24
of the 1991 Corrected Finance Law and Law 91-1323 of 30 Dec. 1991; Ireland: Sec. 36 of
Finance Act of 1991; Italy: Law 142 of 19 Feb. 1992 (which authorized the Government to
issue within one year the necessary Legislative Decree to implement the Directive);
Luxembourg: Law of 6 Dec. 1991; The Netherlands: Bill No. 22.334, 1 Tweede Kamer
(Lower House) 1991-1992 of 7 Oct. 1991 as amended on 10 Dec. 1991, 22.334.8; Portugal:
Decree Law 132/92 of July 1992; United Kingdom: Section 30 Finance (No. 2) Act 192.
206. This is the case because the U.K. does not impose a withholding tax on dividends
paid to a foreign parent company and provides a full tax credit. THOMMES & BETTEN, supra
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tion, and has thus failed to comply with its timing obligation under the
Directive. Nevertheless, as the Directive has direct effect, Greece remains
bound by its provisions except, of course, for the specific exemption
provided to Greece in Article 5.207 The Commission, which must determine whether to bring action against a Member State before the ECJ for
failure to correctly adopt implementing legislation, has not to date notified
any Member State of its intent to sue.208
2.

Distribution of Profits

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Directive loosely uses the
phrase "distributions of profits" rather than dividends. 2 9 This is one of the
more unfortunate shortcomings of the Directive because it has provided yet
another significant degree of discretion to the Member States, and, as a
result, another area of variation in the implementing legislation. The issue
here is whether distributions of profits will be limited strictly to dividends or
whether it can include other types of distributions, such as liquidated
distributions, deemed dividends, and hidden profit distributions.2 10
Many Member States have defined distributions of profits broadly.
Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, and Ireland have all provided that Article
In Ireland, "distributions" will
1 extends to all kinds of distributions.2
include cash dividends and certain interest payments which are recharacterized as dividends; 2 12 however, it is doubtful that this will include
liquidated distributions. Spain has opted for a much more flexible approach.
Its implementing legislation uses the term "distributed profits" and thus gives
its taxing authorities the discretion to determine what payments will qualify
under the Directive. 1 3 Unfortunately, this does little to further tax planning efforts.
While France and Belgium have defined distributions to include only
dividends, it does appear that the Directive in those Member States will apply
to liquidated dividends as well.214 Denmark has interpreted distributions

note 114, IM77-83.
207. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 5(2). In discussing the implementation of the directive, the relevant aspects of the Greek tax system will be mentioned where
it appears no change in Greek law is necessary to comply with its obligation under the
directive.
208. Interview with David Carr, supra note 32.
209. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.
210. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
73 (Ireland);
86 (Germany);
59
211.
THOMMES & BETTEN, supra note 114,
(Luxembourg); and 103 (Portugal).
212.

Id.

213.
214.

Implementation Law 29/1991 of 17 Dec. 1991, art. 17.
THOMMES & BETTEN, supra note 114, 107 (France) and

73.
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to mean dividends but in Danish tax law the term "dividends" has a very
broad definition and includes "hidden distributions in cash or in kind,
liquidation proceeds paid before the calendar year in which the company is
finally liquidated, distributions or a decrease in share capital and sales of
shares to the issuing company itself."2 ' Finally, in Italy it is uncertain how
distributions of profits will be interpreted, while in the U.K. the term only
applies to dividends.2 6
3. Form of Relief: Credit or Exemption
Seven Member States have adopted the exemption method with respect
to profits received by a parent company from its subsidiary while five others
have adopted the credit method." 7 The seven states employing the
exemption method are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.218 The five states using the credit
method are: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the U.K.219
There are three qualifications to the distribution mentioned above. First,
in Denmark, existing legislation provides an exemption for dividends
received from a subsidiary under two conditions: first, the parent company
must own 25% of the total share capital of the company for the entire year
in which the dividend was received; and second, the Danish tax authorities
must determine that the income from which the dividends were drawn was
22
taxed according to rules not significantly different from Danish tax laws. 1
The Danish implementing legislation provides for a tax credit in those rare
instances in which repatriation of dividends qualifies under the Directive but
22
not the existing legislative scheme. 1
The second qualification concerns Germany, which generally applies the
exemption method except for subsidiaries operating in Spain and Portugal
that are not engaged in active trade or business.222 In the latter case, a
credit method is employed.223 The third qualification concerns Spain,
which applies a credit method except in situations in which a tax treaty
provides for the exemption method and the Spanish company opts for this

215. Id. 264 (Denmark) (emphasis added).
216. Id. 84 (United Kingdom).
217. Fred C. de Hosson & Cees-Wim van Noordenne, Current Status of the Implementation of the Direct Tax Directives, 3 EC TAX REv. 156, 157-58 (1992).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Betten, supra note 160, at 134.
221.
Id.
222. DELOITTE TouCHE TOMHATSU INTERNATIONAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC TAX
DIREcTIvEs ON PARENT/SUBSIDIARY

COMPANIES IN THE VARIOUS MEMBER STATES 8, 9

(1992) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC TAX DIRECTIVEs].
223. Id.
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system over the credit method.224
In the five Member States which employ the credit method, an important
issue is whether the corporate tax paid by the second or lower tiered
subsidiary will qualify for relief. In Denmark, Ireland, and Spain the answer
is no.225 In the U.K. and Portugal the answer is yes, except that in the case
of Portugal the relief only extends to a second tier subsidiary.2 26 Yet, in
Ireland, while the answer is textually no, in practice the government extends
credit relief where the lower
tiered subsidiaries reside in the same country as
227
the first tier subsidiary.
4.

Holding of Capital Requirement

The Directive provides that Member States may require the parent
company to have a minimum holding of 25% to qualify for withholding tax
relief at the subsidiary level.228 Every Member State, except Ireland and
the U.K., which do not impose withholding taxes on dividends, has
incorporated a 25% holding requirement into their national legislation.22
Thus, in nine Member States, 230 for dividends to be tax free at the subsidiary level pursuant to Article 5 the parent company must have a minimum
25% of the subsidiary's share capital.
In order to qualify -for tax relief, several Member States have also
required a minimum shareholding requirement in the subsidiary for profits
repatriated to the parent company. The parent company also must have 25%
of the subsidiary's share capital in Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain.23' In the Netherlands, however, the 25% requirement
only applies to portfolio investments; in all other cases, the participation
exemption is 5%.232 In France, in order to qualify for the 95% participation exemption, there is a 10% share capital requirement or investment cost
on acquisition equivalent to FFr 150 million.233 Similarly, in Luxembourg
a. 10% requirement is imposed or acquisition costs of at least fifty million
Lux Francs. 234 The U.K. requires direct or indirect control of 10% of the
voting power 235 while Germany imposes a 10% share capital requirement

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 3(l)(a).
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC DIRECT TAX DIRECTIVES, supra note 222, at 8-9.
The situation for Greece is uncertain. Betten, supra note 160, at 147.
de Hooson & van Noordenne, supra note 217, at 159-60.
Id. at 160. For a further discussion of this point, see Raby, supra note 115, at 218.
de Hosson & van Noordenne, supra note 217, at 159.
Id.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC DIRECT TAX DIRECTIVES, supra note 222, at 8-9.
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and Belgium only a single share requirement.236
Member States also had the option of replacing the holding capital
requirement with that of a holding of voting rights requirement as established
through bilateral agreements with other Member States. 237 Three countries,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and Portugal have incorporated the voting rights
option where it exists in an applicable double taxation treaty.238 In Ireland
and the Netherlands, where such a treaty does exist, a 25% voting rights
standard exists. 23 9 In the U.K., existing domestic law for foreign tax credit
relief applies a minimum voting rights test of 10%.24
5. Minimum Holding Period
The Directive also provides that Member States may preclude from
qualifying under the Directive those companies which have not maintained
holdings in the subsidiary qualifying them as a parent company for an
uninterrupted period of two years.24' In order to qualify for the withholding tax exemption, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain have imposed
the two year holding period requirement.242 Belgium, Germany, Italy, and
the Netherlands have each adopted a one year holding period requirement.243 In Denmark, in order to qualify for both the withholding tax
exemption and the participation exemption, there must be a holding either
during the entire taxable year in which the dividend is received or for a
period of at least two years prior to the time the dividend is received. 2 "
Finally, neither Ireland nor the U.K. impose a minimum holding period.
In order to qualify for the participation exemption, France, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain require that the shareholding be maintained for a two
year period prior to the distribution being received.2 45 Italy requires a

236. THOMMES & BETrEN, supra note 114, 108 (Germany) & 131 (Belgium).
237. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 3.
238. de Hosson & van Noordenne, supra note 217, at 160.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241.
These holdings must exist for a specific period of time prior to distribution being
made, except in the Netherlands and Portugal. In these two countries, qualification for the
exemption will occur by prior holdings either for the stated period or for the guaranteed future
period. See IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC DIRECT TAX DIRECTIVES, supra note 222, at 8-9.
242. Id.; de Hoosen & van Noordenne, supra note 217, at 161.
243. de Hooson & van Noorderme, supra note 217, at 161.
244. THOMMES & BETrEN, supra note 114, at 289 (Denmark).
245. These holdings must exist for the specific period prior to the distribution being
received in Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain. In Ireland, the holding period must exist
prior to the distribution being received where it is so provided by a double taxation treaty.
In France and Portugal, qualification for the exemption occurs by prior holdings either for the
specific time or for the guaranteed future period. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC DIRECT TAX
DIRECTIVES, supra note 222, at 8-9.
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holding period of one year without interruption. 24 Germany requires a
holding period of one year prior to the end of the current fiscal year.2 47 To
qualify for the participation exemption in Luxembourg, the holding period is
twelve months immediately preceding the end of the financial year during
which the dividend is received. 8 Denmark imposes the same requirement
for qualifying for the participation exemption as it does the withholding
Finally, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the U.K. do not
exemption.1
impose any holding period prior to receipt of the distribution.25 0
6.

The Anti-Abuse Provisions

As mentioned previously, the Directive provides the Member States
considerable latitude in adopting anti-fraud and abuse provisions.25 ' Most
of the Member States will rely on their current structure of anti-fraud
provisions contained in either domestic law, bilateral double taxation treaties,
or both.252 Only two States, France and Spain, have adopted specific antiabuse provisions with respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 253 The
Spanish and French legislation precludes, with certain major exceptions, the
application of the Directive where the ultimate shareholders are non-EC
residents. The discussion that follows concentrates on these Spanish and
French anti-abuse measures.
In Spain, the tax benefits provided by the Directive will not apply when
the majority of the voting income share of the parent company is directly or
indirectly held by individuals or entities non-resident in the EC except when
the parent company: (a) effectively undertakes a business activity that is
directly connected with that carried out but its subsidiary; (b) has as its
purpose the management of the subsidiary as demonstrated by an adequate
organization of material and human resources; or (c) provides evidence that
it was incorporated for valid economic purposes and to unduly benefit from
the tax regime provided by the Directive.2 5 Moreover, this tax regime will
not apply when the parent company or the subsidiary is a tax resident in a
territory expressly regarded as a tax haven by a specific statute. 2 "
The French anti-abuse legislation provides that the participation should

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

250. Id.
251. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note I, art. 1.
252. Raby, supra note 115, at 220.
253. See Eamonn McGregor, Implementation of the EC Parent/SubsidiaryDirective in
the Various Member States, 46 BULL. 340, 342 (1992).
254. Raby, supra note 115, at 220.
255. Id.
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not be held as inventory." 6 The intent of this legislation is to exclude nonFrench companies, which means those controlled directly or indirectly by
non-EC residents, from qualifying under the Directive in a manner similar to
the Spanish legislation. However, the exceptions or defenses to the French
anti-abuse legislation soften the provision's bite. Under the French provision,
as long as the primary purpose behind the establishment of the parent
company was not directive shopping, the government will not deny the
benefits of the Directive.257 The criteria for making this determination are
not provided in the legislation. As most corporate structural decisions are not
made solely for tax reasons, however, it would seem difficult, at least in
theory, to run afoul of this French anti-abuse measure.25 Of course, it all
depends on how stringently the French taxing authorities enforce the
measure.
Finally, the other Member States have adopted specific anti-abuse
legislation in response to the Directive. Nevertheless, these Member States
will likely continue to rely on their existing anti-abuse measures where
appropriate. Most Member States have included a measure similar to the
Belgian provision which could deny the Directive to companies located in a
country where the tax regime is considerably more favorable than in
Belgium.259
C. Specific Instances of Non-Conforming Implementing Legislation
From the preceding discussion, it becomes apparent that there are several
instances, some significant while others less so, in which Member States have
deviated from the strict reading of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. While
some of these deviations are safely within the discretion permitted to Member
States in implementing directives, in several instances particular Member
States appear to have gone too far. The Commission is ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance;2 " but in the meantime, as the Directive has
direct effect,2 6' injured parties will have recourse to their national courts.
The following discussion briefly reviews three specific instances where
Member States have adopted provisions that appear inconsistent with the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, leading to potential liability in their national
courts.

256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Nevertheless, it is an issue for U.S. companies to consider in their efforts to take
advantage of and qualify under the Directive. See infra notes 283-93 and accompanying text.
259. THOMMES & BETrEN, supra note 114, 126 (Belgium).
260. EEC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 146. See also supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
261.
See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text.
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First, the anti-abuse legislation as adopted by Spain and France appears
to go further than warranted by the Directive.262 The Directive contains no
language which limits its scope to EC businesses owned by EC nationals.
Thus, France and Spain's efforts to do so through protective legislation
attempts to accomplish something not contemplated in the Directive.
Knobbe-Keuk is correct in her assertion that the scope of the anti-abuse
clause is limited to situations of abuse of the Directive itself.2 63 Second,
the adoption of additional requirements for qualifying under the Directive is
of doubtful legality. The Netherlands, for example, while rejecting a two
year holding requirement permitted under the Directive, has adopted a noninventory clause qualification. 26 This non-inventory clause is intended to
prevent the abuses which the holding requirement was designed to
prevent.265 Despite the fact that the Directive has certain unfortunate
ambiguities, one clear area is the qualification requirements and permissible
derogations under the Directive. Therefore, additional requirements not
expressly provided in the Directive would seem to go too far.
A third problem concerns the requirement of some Member States that
the qualifying participation must be held before receipt of the dividend.2"
The language of the Directive provides no other conclusion but that the
qualifying period can be satisfied either before or after the dividend
payment.267 Thus, Member States such as Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg,
and Spain, which only take a retrospective view, have incorrectly adopted the
Directive. 68
These three examples stand out as instances of non-conforming
implementing legislation. Nevertheless, even the worst-case examples will
not prevent the Directive from working effectively - they will only prevent
it from achieving its full potential in fostering economic cooperation in the
Community.

262. See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying text.
263. Knobbe-Keuk, supra note 141, at 488-89.
264. Boon & Lambooij, supra note I 11, at 8. Under this requirement, a parent company
will only qualify for the participation exemption of its shares in the subsidiary are not
considered under the Dutch tax law as either a portfolio investment or inventory. Id.
265.

Id.

266. See supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
267. Article 3 states that the directive may be denied to "companies of Member States
which do not maintain [rather did not] ... holdings qualifying them as parent companies."
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1,art. 3(2).
268. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EC DIREcT TAX DIREcTIvEs, supra note 222, at 8-9. In
Italy it is uncertain whether the participation requirement can only be satisfied by past
holdings. Id.
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V. THE IMPACT ON U.S. BUSINESSES AND DOMESTIC TAX POLICY
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Community's other direct tax
initiatives2 69 will have an impact on both U.S. businesses with Europeanbased operations and, on a larger scale, the competitive position of U.S.
industry and capital markets vis-A-vis their European counterparts. U.S.
companies with European operations can qualify under the Directive in most,
if not all, Member States and benefit from its provisions. Nevertheless, the
EC direct taxation measures do create a competitive advantage for European
businesses and a change in U.S. domestic tax policy will be necessary to
level the playing field. This chapter will begin with a discussion of exactly
how U.S. companies with European-based operations can benefit from the
Directive. The second half of this chapter will discuss the competitive effects
of the EC tax measures and where changes in U.S. tax policy are needed to
adequately respond to these EC initiatives.
A.

How US. Companies Can Benefit from the Directive

There are two ways in which U.S. companies with European operations
can qualify under the Directive: a change in corporate policy regarding
repatriation of earnings or a change in corporate structure. By retaining
earnings in Europe, U.S. companies could avoid withholding taxes on these
profits; however, as Meier points out, current U.S. tax rules diminish the
viability of this option.27 °
In respect to the latter option, U.S. companies should give serious
consideration to the use of a European based holding company.27' Such a
holding company would allow profits from businesses located in various
Member States to be collected in one location before repatriation to the

269. In addition to the Parent-Subsidiary and Merger Directives and the Arbitration
Convention, the Commission has also promulgated Proposals for an Interest/Royalty Directive
and a Losses Directive. The former is intended to remove intra-Community taxation on
interest and royalties, while the latter is intended to permit European businesses to offset
losses in one Member State against profits in another. See Proposal for a Council Directive
on a Common System of Taxation Applicable to Interest and Royalty Payments Made
Between Parent Companies and Subsidiaries in Different Member States, COM(90)571 final
at 21-24; Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning Arrangements for the Taking into
Account by Enterprises of the Losses of Their Permanent Establishments and Subsidiaries
Situated in Other Member States, COM(90)595 final at 9-12.
270. Donald L. Meier, Europe in 1992: A U.S. Perspective, 45 BULL. 328, 329 (1991)
(explaining that U.S. tax obstacles, including Subpart F rules, tier problems, and sourcing
problems, deny this opportunity to U.S. multinationals).
271.
For an excellent discussion on how a U.S. multinational can utilize the Merger
Directive to restructure its operations in Europe without incurring significant taxes as a result,
and thus take advantage of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, see Walter F. O'Connor, U.S.
Views on CurrentEuropeanParent-SubsidiaryTax Developments, 18 INT'L TAX J. 81 (1992).
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United States. This way, only one withholding tax would apply rather than
several. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, however, the choice to employ
a holding company has significant tax implications.2 72 The first part of this
section will discuss the use of a European holding company (EHC) and the
U.S. tax implications involved in such a choice. The second part discusses
the factors in choosing a site for an EHC, with particular emphasis on
Luxembourg.
1. European Holding Company
For many years U.S. companies have viewed the use of an EHC as
unfavorable because the use of a holding company would only add an
additional layer of withholding tax. Every state where a subsidiary was
located would apply its withholding taxes to dividends destined for the
holding company, and then withholding tax would be applied again to
dividends from the holding company to the parent, creating excess foreign
tax credits. 273 Now, in light of the Directive a holding company in one
Member State can collect dividends from subsidiaries located in other
Member States before repatriating monies back to the United States. This
reduces from several to one the number of withholding taxes applied.
Moreover, an EHC established by a U.S. corporation should qualify under the
Directive, particularly where such holding companies have active operations
and are not merely shells established to benefit from the Directive.274
Obviously, this method does not entirely eliminate withholding taxes since
one layer still exists. Therefore, to the extent a European business qualifies
for the Directive it will have a competitive advantage over its U.S.
counterparts. Nevertheless, while this layer of withholding tax remains
unavoidable (at least as of yet) it can be minimized. The choice of the
location for the EHC should rely in part upon which Member State has the
most favorable double taxation treaty with the United States. Finally, two
additional factors merit consideration in a determining whether to use a
holding company: the tax implications and certain factors concerning the site.

272. Patrick L. Kelley, Post-1992 Tax Planningin the Single EuropeanMarket, 12 TAX
ADVISOR's FORUM 1371, 1372 (1991).
273. Lutz Fischer, European Communities: The Meaning of EC Tax Harmonizationand
the Internal Marketfor U.S. Business and U.S. Tax Legislation, 45 BULL. 319, 320 (1991).
274. This is generally not a problem because most corporate structural changes are not
made solely on tax reasons. Nevertheless, as noted in the previous chapter, France and Spain
have adopted provisions as part of their anti-abuse measures to prevent, with very broad
exceptions, non-Community companies from benefiting from the directive. See supra notes
251-59 and accompanying text.
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Tax Implications of Utilizing an EHC

There are four significant tax implications involved in the use by U.S.
corporations of an EHC: the applicability of Subpart F rules, tiering concerns,
foreign tax credits and sourcing problems, and the reorganization of the EC
companies which, although tax-free locally, may still be taxable in the United
States.27" The following is intended to give a brief overview of these
complications.
In situations where a group of subsidiaries are organized under an EHC,
Subpart F rules will treat each Member State as a separate jurisdiction and
thus will preclude the "same-country exception" under the rule applying to
transactions between subsidiaries in different Member States.276 Because
an exception does not exist, Subpart F provides that the dividends received
constitute foreign personal holdings company income.277 Moreover, this
foreign personal holdings company income is currently taxable to the U.S.
27
parent company of the holding company even if not actually distributed. 1
Another potential problem exists with respect to the indirect tax credit,
that is, for foreign taxes to be paid concerning business earnings of foreign
affiliates. Under the three-tier rule, indirect taxes are only available for taxes
paid on income of the first, second, and third corporate tiers below the U.S.
company.279 Thus, a corporate restructuring which would add a fourth tier
will not receive credits for foreign taxes paid by that tier.
Another concern for utilizing an EHC is that a future sale of a subsidiary
may result in unfavorable foreign tax credit implications. Where a foreign
holding company sells a subsidiary, any realization of gain on the sale is
treated as foreign source income if the following circumstances exist: the
subsidiary is engaged in active trade or business, and more than 50% of its
gross income during the previous three years was derived from the active
conduct of trade or business carried on in its country of incorporation.28
Finally, a restructuring of U.S.-held, EC-based companies that are taxfree locally may still have tax in the United States. Under Section 367,
certain restructuring involving foreign corporations does not have tax-free

•275.
Nicolaas T. van der Kloot, Europe 1992: A U.S. Tax Perspective, 45 BULL. 34, 3738 (1991).
276. The Internal Revenue Code excepts from taxable income under Subpart F dividends
and interest from a related person when the dividends and interest are: 1) received from a
corporation organized under the laws of the same foreign country as the recipient-controlled
foreign corporation; and (2) the paying corporation has a substantial part of its assets used in
business located in the same foreign country. I.R.C. § 954(c)(3)(A)(1) (1992).
277. Id. § 954(A)(1) & (C).
278. Id. § 951(a).
279. See Meier, supra note 270, at 329.
280.
I.R.C. § 865(f) (1992).
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treatment unless specific conditions are met. 28 1 Here, the intent of U.S. tax
authorities is three-fold: first, to prevent the transfer of appreciated assets
outside of the U.S. taxing jurisdiction; second, to permit the earnings of a
controlled foreign corporation to be repatriated without being subject to
taxation; and third, to insure that Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFCs) do
not avoid Subpart F treatment by becoming "decontrolled., 2 2 The result
is that a European company may make certain strategic business reorganizations tax-free, while a U.S. company attempting the same maneuver will be
subject to U.S. taxation. This further hinders U.S. decision-making
concerning its European operations and establishes another disadvantage visd-vis its European counterparts.
3.

Choosing the Site for an EHC

Choosing a site for an EHC involves several important tax-related
considerations. The terms of the existing double taxation treaty between the
particular Member State and the United States are of paramount importance.
Because the Directive will not apply to earnings repatriated from the EC back
to a U.S. parent company, it remains crucial to identify an existing double
taxation treaty with the most advantageous terms, particularly the lowest
withholding tax rate. In addition, two other important factors are the level
of taxes imposed by the holding company country on foreign income and the
taxes imposed by that country on accumulated income.28 3
In light of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, several factors require
consideration specifically. First and most importantly is whether a holding
company established in a particular Member State will qualify under the
Directive (e.g., is it subject to corporation tax? Is it a recognized corporate
form? And so forth). 284 A second consideration is whether the particular
Member State has chosen to adopt the optional (up to) two year holding
requirement under Article 3. If this is the case, and if the Member State has
chosen to make this retroactive from the time of the dividend payment, then
an EHC created under this regime cannot benefit from the Directive during
the two year period.285

281.
Id. § 376(a) (for "outbound transfers" -which involve property moving from the
United States to the foreign corporation); Treas. Reg. 7.367, § (b)(1)-(13) (for all other
transactions not involving outbound transfers of property).
282.

PAUL R. MCDANIEL & HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTER-

NATIONAL TAXATION 121 (3d ed. 1989); O'Connor, supra note 271, at 83. For example, if
a U.S.-based branch in Europe has been operating at a loss, the losses have been applied
against its U.S. tax liability. Should the U.S. parent decide to restructure its operations by
incorporating the branch, U.S. tax rules require it to recapture the loss.
283. HOLDING COMPANIES (LuxEMBOURG) 31 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
284. Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1,art. 3(2).
285. See supra notes 241-50 and accompanying text.
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Another factor is whether the particular Member State has enacted antiabuse measures, such as those designed specifically to preclude nonCommunity countries from benefiting from the Directive. For this reason,
France and Spain, which have enacted such legislation (albeit with very
broad exceptions) should be considered with caution as potential sites to
locate an EHC.286
A fourth factor relates to whether the Member State utilizes the
exemption or credit method. Generally, a Member State that applies the
exemption rather than the credit method serves as a better site.287 This is
because the exemption method completely abolishes double taxation in the
parent company's Member State, whereas the credit method will not always
abolish double taxation in situations where the subsidiary's Member State
applies a higher corporate income tax than does the parent company's
Member State.28' For this reason the U.K., which applies a credit method
and has among the lowest corporate income taxes in the Community, is not
a particularly favorable site for an EHC.289 In those instances in which a
U.S. company would prefer to locate a holding company in one of the five
Member States 290 which will utilize the credit method, an additional factor
would be whether that Member State will recognize corporate taxes paid by
291
a second or lower tier subsidiary.
Based on these factors and additional advantageous provisions within its
national legislation, one Member State stands out as an excellent potential
site for an EHC: Luxembourg. 292 Luxembourg has recently adopted new
legislation which has some interesting and appealing aspects for the investor
and tax planner. The following discussion provides the reader with a broad
outline of the tax advantages, as well as293some related disadvantages, of
utilizing a Luxembourg holding company.

286. Nevertheless, some commentators believe that France is a good potential site for an
EHC. See Ned Shelton & Freddy de Petter, Holding Companies: Review of the New
Luxembourg Rules and Six Other Countries (pt. II), 31 EUR. TAX'N 107, 110 (1991); Pierre
Ullman, The Use of French Holding Companies by MultinationalGroups, 18 INT'L TAX J. 49
(1992).
287. See Kelley, supra note 272, at 1373.
288. Id.
289. On the other hand, this does have the advantage of creating fewer foreign tax credits.
290. These Member States are Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom. Germany also applies the credit method under certain circumstances. See supra
notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
291.
Germany, Portugal, and the U.K. do recognize corporate taxes paid by lower-tier
subsidiaries. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
292. Some other sites worth considering include Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
See Ned Shelton & Freddy de Petter, Holding Companies:A Review of the New Luxembourg
Rules and Six Other Countries (pt. 1), 31 EUR. TAX'N 63 (1991).
293.
For a more thorough discussion, see Edward Bruin, Luxembourg: The New Holding
Company: Modern Fashion of an Older Principle,31 EuR. TAx'N 99 (1991).
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B. An EHC in Luxembourg
For nearly seventy years, Luxembourg has had one of Europe's most
attractive holding company regimes. In response to the adoption of the
Directive, and also probably to maintain its competitiveness, in December of
1990 Luxembourg introduced new legislation on holding companies by
creating the socit6 de participation financiers, SOPARFI. 294 The difference between SOPARFI and holding companies established under
Luxembourg's prior legislation is that SOPARFI is a normal commercial
company and capital gains are now exempt.
Under Luxembourg law, the SOPARFI has the same status as a normal
commercial company.29 This has several important implications. First, the
SOPARFI is theoretically subject to the entire corporate income tax rate
which has recently been reduced in 1991 from 34% to 33%.296 The
consequence of this is that the new Luxembourg holding company now
should qualify for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, and no less importantly,
to Luxembourg's network of tax treaties.2 9 7 This means that earnings
repatriated from the holding company in Luxembourg will qualify for the
29
reduced rate of 5% under the U.S.-Luxembourg double taxation treaty.
This change represents a significant advantage over the old holding company
system.29
To the extent that the SOPARFI has a "substantial holding" in either a
resident 300 or non-resident subsidiary, dividends received from the subsidiary are exempt. To qualify as a substantial holding, first, the subsidiary
must either be a Luxembourg company subject to Luxembourg's corporate
tax or a non-resident company subject to a similar corporate income tax.

294. Kelley, supra note 272, at 1373 n.4 (citing Law of 6 Dec. 1990, Memorial A.
Journal de Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg, at 1023 (1990)).
295. HOLDING COMPANIES, supra note 283, at 31.
296. Id.
297. If there is any specific drawback to using Luxembourg as an EHC site, it is its
relatively small network of double taxation treaties (at least compared to other Member
States). As of 1991 Luxembourg had only 17 double taxation treaties, while Belgium and
France had 42 and 76, respectively. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 163, at 27-28, 106-07, 200.
298. This rate applies if the U.S. parent company owns at least 50% of the voting shares
of the holding company that pays the dividend and if not more than 25% of the holding
company's income is derived from interest and dividends other than interest and dividends
received from its subsidiaries. Id. at 200.
299. Under the older system, the Luxembourg holding company was precluded from
Luxembourg's tax treaty network and often ran afoul of various anti-avoidance legislation in
the shareholder's country of residence. Moreover, the older holding company system would
not have qualified under the Directive. See Shelton & de Petter, supra note 292, at 67.
300.
For a Luxembourg subsidiary to qualify, it must be subject to corporate taxation; this
has the result of precluding holding companies established under Luxembourg's traditional
holding company system. Id. at 67.
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Second, the participation must constitute at least 10% of the share capital of
the subsidiary or at least fifty million Lux francs. Third, the shares must
have been held continuously since the beginning of the fiscal year. Finally,
the subsidiary must be involved in a genuine economic activity."'
Another innovation under Luxembourg's new holding company rules
deals with the treatment of capital gains. Under these new rules the capital
gains resulting from the sale or disposition of shares in a subsidiary are
exempt if certain conditions are satisfied. These conditions include the four
above as well as two more: first, the shares must have been held for a least
one year preceding the beginning of the fiscal year in which the sale is made;
least 25%
and second, during this period, the participation must have been at
30 2
francs.
Lux
million
250
or
subsidiary,
the
of
capital
share
of the
For these reasons, Luxembourg is a particularly favorable site for locating
an EHC. Yet, for U.S. firms to take full advantage of Luxembourg's
favorable tax regime for holding companies and realize the benefits of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, changes in U.S. domestic tax law are necessary.
C.

The Need for US. Domestic Tax Changes

As one European commentator noted, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
represents the advent of an entirely new dimension of tax law: in addition to
domestic and international treaty-based law, a regional European-based tax
dimension now exists.30 3 This new dimension, and specifically the ParentSubsidiary Directive, changes the balance of investment incentives to favor
more internal EC investment. It also represents another competitive
disadvantage to U.S. companies with European-based operations vis-i-vis
their European counterparts. To restore the balance, and thereby allow U.S.
companies to compete on an equal footing in Community markets, several
U.S. domestic tax. laws require modification or abolition. Without such
changes, U.S. tax laws will limit the success of U.S. businesses in a single
European market.
This section will begin with a discussion of the competitive consequences
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, its effects on the U.S. domestic capital
market and on U.S. businesses operating in Europe. The second section will
discuss the specific U.S. tax rules which should be abolished or modified as
well as whether, in light of current U.S. tax policy and the domestic political
situation, such changes are likely.

Id.
301.
302. Id.
303. Otmar Th6mmes, The European Dimension in International Tax Law, 10 INTERTAX
464 (1990).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss1/6

50

1994]

PARENT-SUBSIDIARY DIRECTIVE

Harris: The European Community's Parent-Subsidiary Directive

1. Competitive Effects of the Parent Subsidiary Directive
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive in one respect merely harmonizes
existing practice within the Community, the United States, and other
industrial countries. But in another respect the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
seems more liberal and enterprising, resulting in a change in investment
incentives in favor of EC internal investment and improving the competitive
position of European companies over American companies with European
operations.
Article 4 of the Directive does not present any potential competitive
challenge to U.S. businesses or tax policy.304 Most of the Member States,
as well as the United States and other industrial countries, already provide
some form of credit or exemption to taxes paid on foreign earnings. But
Article 5, the provision which eliminates withholding taxes on dividends, is
another matter.30 5 The United States still maintains high statutory rates of
withholding tax on dividends.3 6 In practice, however, treaty arrangements
reduce this rate by providing relatively high rates for portfolio investors and
lower levels for "direct" investors.307 Both the U.S. model treaty and the
OECD provide for rates of 15 and 5% for portfolio and direct investment
respectively. Yet, though these rates are lower, the taxation on dividends still
exists. The system in Article 5 represents a departure from existing practice.
The abolition of withholding taxes in the Community creates a system
which favors internal EC investment. As Devereux and Pearson point out,
the elimination of withholding taxes within the EC has a much greater impact
than even harmonization of tax rates and tax base in terms of investment
decisions between the EC and the United States. 30 8 The Parent-Subsidiary
Directive means, practically speaking, that EC investors will avoid dividend
withholding taxes by investing within the EC rather than in the United States
or elsewhere. This incentive could reduce the amount of capital available to
U.S. businesses in the U.S. capital market. Moreover, to the extent the EC
investor's home country offers a participation exemption, the incentive to
invest "at home" only becomes more attractive. 3 9 Interestingly, President
Clinton's tax proposals do not appear to offer anything to stem this flow, but
rather seem more preoccupied with discouraging expatriation of American

304.
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, supra note 1, art. 4.
305. Id. art. 5.
306. The withholding tax on dividends is 30%. I.R.C. §§ 871(a), 881(a) (1992).
307. I.R.C. § 902(a) (1992).
308. Michael Devereux & Mark Pearson, The Interactionof Corporate Tax Between the
EC, Japan and the United States, 46 BULL. 367, 376 (1992). See also Mark Pearson, 1992:
The Impact on Corporate Tax Planning,17 TAx PLAN. INT'L REv. 3 (1990).
309.
Fischer, supra note 273, at 321.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

51

JOURNAL Law,
OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW Art. 6
Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1994],

[Vol. 9

investment dollars.3 1°
Moreover, even in situations in which U.S. businesses can change their
corporate structure to take advantage of the Directive, a layer of dividend
withholding tax, albeit at reduced levels through careful planning and
applicable double taxation treaties, still remains, leaving another competitive
disadvantage for U.S. companies. The existence of the extra layer of taxes
reduces the profitability of U.S. businesses in comparison with European
businesses.3 1 Finally, in those situations in which a U.S. business is
unable to qualify for the Directive either because a change in corporate
structure is not feasible or because of anti-abuse legislation of a particular
Member State, profitability compared with European competitors will only
be lower.
2.

Necessary Changes in U.S. Tax Law

U.S. companies can qualify under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and
thereby benefit from its provisions. As discussed in the preceding section,
however, the Directive does not change the system of investment incentives
and it will also provide a further competitive advantage to EC-based
businesses. U.S. domestic tax law, however, currently hampers the ability
for American businesses to successfully compete in the Community market.
Some U.S. business leaders charge that the change in EC direct taxation only
highlights the obsolescence of U.S. tax law. 31 2

In order to permit U.S.

businesses to compete on an equal footing with European businesses in the
Community, several specific changes must be made in U.S. domestic tax law.
First, the United States should abolish withholding taxes on dividends
either unilaterally or bilaterally, at least insofar as direct investment dividends
and the EC Member States are concerned. The United States could achieve
this either by separate treaties with each of the Member States or a single
treaty with the entire Community. 313 In this way, firms can avoid the extra

layer of taxation upon repatriation of dividends from the EC to the United
Yann Kergall, Are President Clinton's Tax Proposals European Inspired?, 2
60 (1993).
311. The competitive disadvantage caused by this extra layer of European tax which U.S.
companies but not their European counterparts incur is further exacerbated by the system of
U.S. taxation on U.S. companies with foreign operations. Under these rules, U.S. companies
are fully taxable on their foreign source income, with double taxation purportedly avoided by
the use of a foreign tax credit. However, because the U.S. corporate tax rate is below those
in EC countries, the European taxes paid can only offset U.S. tax liability to the extent of the
U.S. rate of 34%. This is further complicated by the basket system in which tax credits
generated in one basket may not be used against a U.S. foreign source that falls into another
310.

INTERTAX

basket.
312. Meier, supra note 270, at 329; van der Kloot, supra note 275, at 34.
313. This is similar to the proposal Hamaekers is urging the Commission to adopt. See
Hamaekers, supra note 183, at 360.
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States.
The United States should also treat the EC as one country for purposes
of Subpart F.314 This would negate the problem of dividend income of
European holdings being immediately taxable in the United States as Subpart
F income. It would also permit U.S. companies to adapt their corporate
structure to take advantage of the Directive.
Finally, the United States should eliminate the three-tier rule, or at least
not apply it to American businesses with European holding companies. U.S.
companies should have the ability to adopt corporate structures in the
Community that allow them to minimize European taxation. If this corporate
structure involves additional tiers, U.S. companies should have the power to
avoid claiming taxes paid by any wholly-owned subsidiary.
Unfortunately, these proposals lack political acceptability. In the United
States, withholding taxes play an integral role in U.S. tax policy and provide
a mechanism to ensure equity in the overall U.S. tax system.3t 5 Moreover,
under the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress solidified the position of
withholding taxes in U.S. tax policy rather than undermining it3 16 through
the branch profits tax. The branch profits tax would attempt to tax U.S.
foreign business conducted through a branch in the same way U.S. foreign
subsidiaries are taxed. 1 7 Recent measures in tax treaty policy aimed at
preventing tax treaty shopping further prevent efforts to avoid withholding
taxes.318 But most significantly, the United States makes it unlikely that
Congress will accept any initiatives, which most likely will be perceived as
reducing tax revenues no matter how potentially salutary they may be. 3t 9
Political considerations, and particularly the magnitude of the deficit, may
prevent the United States from enacting, at least temporarily, innovative and
far-reaching initiatives like the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Yet U.S. tax
laws should also adapt to enhance the chances for success and growth of U.S.
businesses with European operations.

314. Some U.S. tax theorists have even advocated the complete abolition of Subpart F
rules because they are extraordinarily complex and are not justified in their current limited
functions. See MCDANIEL & AULT, supra note 282, at 120. However, with European taxes
continuing to be reduced, it appears that Subpart F will no longer have such limited
application.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. I.R.C. § 884 (1992).
318. H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An
Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1981).
319. Nevertheless, there was a bill introduced in the House which would have
accomplished many of the tax changes necessary to assist U.S. businesses in the Community.
This bill, unfortunately, was never considered, primarily for the considerations outlined above.
H.R. 4136, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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CONCLUSION

After a long and tumultuous development period, the Community has
adopted bold and enterprising initiatives in direct taxation. The ParentSubsidiary Directive in particular fosters intra-Community corporate
cooperation and development. While the Directive has some unfortunate
ambiguities, these do not detract from its primary objective. With some
ambiguities in implementation, the Commission will probably attempt to
establish greater uniformity either through negotiation or use of the ECJ.
Nevertheless, the tax planner and investor should be mindful of the
differences and opportunities in the implementing legislation of the Member
States.
The United States and other non-Community countries with European
operations can qualify under the Directive. The most promising possibility
is through a corporate restructuring using a European holding company.
This, however, is not without its U.S. tax implications. In a world market
in which U.S. multinationals are experiencing greater competition and are
further disadvantaged by foreign restrictions, the United States can no longer
afford to artificially restrict its industry by antiquated tax laws. In order for
U.S. corporations to compete with their European counterparts, take
advantage of the European internal market, and take advantage of bold new
initiatives such as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, a change in U.S. domestic
tax policy is essential.
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